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This dissertation consists of  three essays in microeconomic theory. The ﬁrst and second
essays are in the theory of  matching, with hierarchical organizations and complementarities
being their respective topic. The third essay is in on electoral competition and political
polarization as a result of  manipulation of  public opinion through social inﬂuence networks.
Hierarchies are a common organizational structure in institutions. In the ﬁrst essay, I
offer an explanation of  this fact from a matching-theoretic perspective, which emphasizes the
importance of  stable outcomes for the persistence of  organizational structures. I study the
matching of  individuals (talents) via contracts with institutions, which are aggregate market
actors, each composed of  decision makers (divisions) enjoined by an institutional governance
structure. Conﬂicts over contracts between divisions of  an institution are resolved by the
institutional governance structure, whereas conﬂicts between divisions across institutions
are resolved by talents’ preferences. Stable market outcomes exist whenever institutional
governance is hierarchical and divisions consider contracts to be bilaterally substitutable.
In contrast, when governance in institutions is non-hierarchical, stable outcomes may not
exist. Since market stability does not provide an impetus for reorganization, the persistence
of  markets with hierarchical institutions can thus be rationalized. Hierarchies in institutions
also have the attractive incentive property that in a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game with
talents making offers to institutions, the choice problem for divisions is straightforward and
realized market outcomes are pairwise stable, and stable when divisions have substitutable
preferences.
Complementarity has proved to be a challenge for many-to-one matching theory, be-
cause the core and group stable matchings may fail to exist. Less well understood is the
more basic notion of  pairwise stability. In a second essay, I deﬁne a class of  complemen-
tarity, asymmetric complements, and show that pairwise stable matchings are guaranteed to ex-
ist in matching markets where no ﬁrm considers workers to be asymmetric complements.
The lattice structure of  the pairwise stable matchings, familiar from the matching theory
with substitutes, does not survive in this more general domain. The simultaneous-offer and
sequential-offer versions of  the worker-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm can pro-
duce different matchings when workers are not necessarily substitutable. If  no ﬁrm considers
workers to be imperfect complements, then the simultaneous-offer version produces a pairwise
stable matching, but this is not necessarily true otherwise. If  no ﬁrm considers workers to
be asymmetric complements, a weaker restriction than no imperfect complements, then the
sequential-offer version produces a pairwise stable matching, though the matching produced
is order-dependent.
In a third essay, I examine electoral competition in which two candidates compete
through policy and persuasion, and using a tractable two-dimensional framework with social
learning provide an explanation for increasing political polarization. Voters and candidates
have policy preferences that depend upon the state of  the world, which is known to candi-
dates but not known to voters, and are connected through a social inﬂuence network that
determines through a learning process the ﬁnal opinion of  voters, where the voters’ initial
opinions and the persuasion efforts of  the candidates affect ﬁnal opinions, and so voting
behavior. Equilibrium level of  polarization in policy and opinion (of  both party and pop-
ulation) increases when persuasion costs decrease. An increase in homophily increases the
equilibrium level of  policy polarization and population opinion polarization. These com-
parative static results help explain the increased polarization in both the policy and opinion
dimensions in the United States.
To my mother, and to my father, who knew an absent-minded professor when he saw one
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Chapter 1
Stability and Matching with
Aggregate Actors
1.1 Introduction
Hierarchies of  decision-makers are the dominant form of  organizational design in a wide
variety of  institutions, from social institutions such as families and communities, to political
institutions such as the executive branch of  government, to economic institutions such as
large corporations or small ﬁrms. This robust empirical fact of  real-world organizations
has prompted many theories to explain their existence and their functioning. Given the
key role ﬁrms play in the operation of  the economy, the hierarchical ﬁrm is of  particular
interest to economists and organizational theorists. Managerial hierarchies determine the
allocation of  resources within the ﬁrm, particularly through their role in conﬂict resolution,
and also enable coordination of  activities in the ﬁrm. A potential alternative to hierarchies
for internal allocation is a market-like exchange mechanism, where claims on resources are
more widely distributed within the organization, in the manner of  cooperatives. However,
while ﬁrms may have lateral equity, they usually still possess a clear vertical structure1.
1For evidence on hierarchies and decentralization in ﬁrms, their impact on productivity, see Bloom et al.
(2010).
1
Many theories have been proposed to explain the existence of  hierarchies in real-world
organization of  production, a structure at odds with the decentralized market mechanism
coordinating economic activity. The transactions costs and incomplete contracts theories
and the procedural rationality theory are some responses to this limitation of  the basic the-
ory of  the ﬁrm. One goal of  these theories has been to explain why ﬁrms exist or why they
may be hierarchical, usually taking the market as exogenous and unaffected by the organi-
zational design of  the ﬁrm. I wish, instead, to turn the question on its head and ask how the
organizational design of  institutions can impact the performance of  the market as a whole,
where the market constitutes the free environment with institutions and individuals.
In this paper I argue that the organizational structure within each institution, what I
identify as its governance structure, can indeed have important implications for market-level
outcomes and market performance. Speciﬁcally I study how complex institutions, each com-
posed of  multiple actors called divisions with varying interests mediated by an institutional
governance structure, come to make market-level choices. The governance structure is a
deﬁning feature of  the institution, a product of  its internal rules of  coordinated resource al-
location, conﬂict resolution, and culture. A production team in a ﬁrm, for example, could
demand the same skilled worker as another team, creating a conﬂict for the human resource.
The skilled worker may have a preference for one team over another, but this preference
may not be sufﬁcient to effect a favorable institutional decision, due to a governance struc-
ture that in this case strongly empowers the less-preferred production team. Thus, unlike
the market governance structure, where parties can freely negotiate and associate, an insti-
tutional governance structure can restricts how parties inside the institution can do so.
The main result of  this paper is that whenever institutions have governance structures
that are inclusive hierarchies then stable market outcomes will exist. This existence result
for the aggregate actors matching model relies upon the existence result of Hatﬁeld and Ko-
jima (2010), who generalize the many-to-one matching with contracts model of Hatﬁeld and
Milgrom (2005). The emergent choice behavior of  institutions that have inclusive hierar-
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chies is bilaterally substitutable whenever the divisions have bilaterally substitutable choice
functions. In essence, inclusive hierarchies preserve the property of  bilaterally substitutabil-
ity of  choice, leading to the existence result. Also preserved by this aggregation procedure is
the Irrelevance of  Rejected Contracts condition introduced by Aygün and Sönmez (2012b),
which is a maintained assumption throughout this paper. As shown by those authors in
Aygün and Sönmez (2012a), this condition is required when working with choice functions
rather than with preferences as primitive. Other choice properties that are preserved in-
clude the weak substitutes condition of Hatﬁeld and Kojima (2008) and the Strong Axiom
of  Revealed Preference.
Many transactions in the real world have the feature that one side is an individual such
as a supplier of  labor or intermediate inputs and the other side is an institution such as a
large buyer ﬁrm, where the individual seeks just one relationship but the institution usually
seeks many with different individuals. The standard model of  matching where institutional
welfare matters assumes that the institution is a single-minded actor with preferences, just
like the individuals on the other side, but this black-box approach does not allow for an
analysis of  institutional level details. In practice, institutional choice behavior is determined
by multiple institutional actors within a governance structure, which is the set of  rules and
norms regulating the internal functioning of  the institution. As institutions seek to allocate
resources amongst competing internal objectives, perhaps embodied in the divisions of  the
institutions, they often do so often without resorting to a price mechanism, but to a hier-
archical mechanism instead. A central contribution of  my work is to explain this fact by
analyzing the interplay between institutional governance and market governance of  trans-
actions, which in spite of  being an empirical feature of  many real-world markets has been
relatively unstudied from the matching perspective.
I use the matching model with aggregate actors to provide a theory for the widespread
presence in ﬁrms of  hierarchies with partial decentralization in decision-making in the con-
text of  factor markets. I show that hierarchical ﬁrms transacting with heterogeneous indi-
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viduals in a market leads to outcomes that are in the core of  the economy and are stable in a
matching-theoretic sense. I support this observation by showing via examples how even in a
simple setting with basic contracts (where a contract only speciﬁes the two parties involved)
and with unit-demand for factors by every division within the ﬁrms, an internal governance
structure that distributes power more broadly amongst divisions and allows for trading by di-
visions of  claims to contracts can create market-level instabilities that result in non-existence
of  stable or core outcomes. While this example does not rule out the possibility of  market
stability with such internal governance structures, it does demonstrate the difﬁculty of  con-
structing a general theory in this regard while maintaining the importance of  stability of
market outcomes.
The importance of  institutional-level analysis of  choice has been amply demonstrated in
the recent market design work of Sönmez and Switzer (2012), Sönmez (2011) and Kominers
and Sönmez (2012). These authors study market design where the objectives of  institutions
can be multiple and complex, and the manner in which these objectives are introduced into
the design has a material effect on design desiderata such as stability and strategyproofness.
My work is similar to these authors’ works in the feature that choice is realized by an in-
stitutional procedure, though in the case of  market design the only agents for the purposes
of  welfare are the individuals. My work is also similar to Westkamp (2012), who studies a
problem of  matching with complex constraints using a sequential choice procedure.
This paper, and the previously mentioned work in market design, rests upon the the-
ory of  stable matchings, initiated by Gale and Shapley (1962), which has been one of  the
great successes of  economic theory, providing an analytical framework for the study of  both
non-monetary transactions and transactions with non-negligible indivisibilities.2 This the-
ory underpins the work in market design, where solutions to real-world allocation problems
cannot feature monetary transfers and centralized mechanisms can overcome limitations of
a decentralized market. Matching theory is also illuminating in the study of  heterogeneous
labor markets and supply chain networks, where transactions between agents are conducted
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in a decentralized setting. The approach of  studying a heterogeneous labor market using
a matching-theoretic framework was pioneered by Crawford and Knoer (1981) and Kelso
and Crawford (1982), and further explored by Roth (1984b) and Roth (1985). Hatﬁeld and
Milgrom (2005) provide the modern matching with contracts framework on which much
new work in matching theory is built, this paper included. Ostrovsky (2008) studies sup-
ply networks using the matching with contracts approach, work that has been followed by
Westkamp (2010), Hatﬁeld and Kominers (2012b), and Hatﬁeld et al. (2012).
The real-world relevance of  stability has been part of  the extensive evidence collected
by Alvin Roth for the usefulness of  the matching framework for understanding inter alia
professional labor markets. In Roth (1984a), the author describes and analyzes the history
of  the market for medical residents in the United States, and makes the case that stability
of  outcomes affected the evolution of  the organizational form of  the market, and that the
success and persistence of  the National Residency Matching Program should be attributed
to the stability of  the outcomes it produces under straightforward behavior. Further support
for the relevance of  stability comes from the evidence provided in Roth (1991), where the
author documents a natural experiment in the use of  a variety of  market institutions in a
number of  regional British markets for physicians and surgeons. In regions with matching
procedures that under straightforward behavior produce stable outcomes, the procedures
were successful in making the market operate smoothly and persisted. In some regions where
the procedures in use did not necessarily produce stable outcomes, the market eventually
failed to work well and these procedures were abandoned.3 While this evidence might be
construed as support for centralization of  matching, the market forces are unrelated to the
centralization or decentralization of  the market, most clear in the fact that some of  the
centralized regional procedures in Britain failed to survive. Instead, the evidence points to
2The theoretical argument that ﬁnal market outcomes will be stable can be traced back to the Edgeworth’s
approach to realized transactions as “ﬁnalized settlements”, which are “contract[s] which cannot be varied
with the consent of  all parties to it [and] …which cannot be varied by recontract within the ﬁeld of  competition”
(see pg. 19 of Edgeworth (1881)). The core of  a game is a generalization of  Edgeworth’s recontracting notion,
and the stability concept of  Gale and Shapley the analogue of  the core for the class of  two-sided matching
problems, when considered in the cooperative game framework.
5
the importance of  the ﬁnal outcome being a stable one.
In order to provide a non-cooperative game-theoretic understanding of  my model, I
study a two-stage game where talents make offers to institutions in the ﬁrst stage, and then
divisions within institutions choose from the available set of  offers by using the internal mech-
anism of  the institution. Focusing on subgame perfect Nash equilibria, I show that with
hierarchical structures these equilibria yield pairwise stable outcomes. This supports the
argument for inclusive hierarchical governance structures, in this case relying upon the no-
tion that as internal mechanisms they have good local incentive properties for a given choice
situation, in addition to their market-stability properties.
The positive and normative properties of  hierarchies as allocative mechanisms when
modeled as dictatorial structures has been explored in the indivisible goods setting (see Sön-
mez and Ünver (2011) for a survey) and in the continuous setting; for a hierarchical coun-
terpart to the classic exchange economy model, see for example Piccione and Rubinstein
(2007).4
The closest line of  inquiry, in terms of  both question and method, is Demange (2004).
Her work focuses on explaining hierarchies as an organizational form for a group given a
variety of  coordination problems facing this group, using a cooperative game approach with
a characteristic function to represent the value of  various coalitions. With superadditivity,
she ﬁnds that hierarchies distribute blocking power in such a way that the core exists. An
important difference in this paper is the presence of  multiple organizations in a bigger mar-
ket. My analysis complements her study in showing that hierarchies are important not only
because they produce stability in her sense, but also because they behave well in competition
in a bigger market.
A well-established theory of  hierarchies in organizations is the transaction costs theory,
3The British study is all the more intriguing because of  the survival of  a particular class of  unstable proce-
dures. Roth (1991) suggests that the smallness of  these particular markets (numbering two) might be playing a
role by removing the “impersonal” aspect of  the other larger markets.
4There are a host of  papers studying non-price mechanisms, some of  which can serve as models of  hier-
archies. Some important works include Satterthwaite, Sonnenschein (1981), Svensson (1999), Pápai (2000),
Piccione and Razin (2009), and Jordan (2006).
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introduced by Ronald Coase in 1937 and then thoroughly pursued by Oliver Williamson
(see Williamson (2002) for a more recent summary). In the transactions costs theory, not all
market transactions can be secured solely through contracts, because the governance rules
of  the market do not allow for it. For example, the buyer of  a speciﬁc input could contract
with one of  a number of  potential suppliers, but the relationship is plagued by the problem
of  hold up, since the outside value of  the input is low. This example of  a transaction cost, it
is argued, is avoided by a vertical integration of  production into the buying ﬁrm.5
Yet another perspective on hierarchies is the procedural rationality approach of  Herbert
Simon, perhaps best captured by the following quotation from a lecture in his book The New
Science of  Management Decision:
An organization will tend to assume hierarchical form whenever the task envi-
ronment is complex relative to the problem-solving and communicating powers
of  the organization members and their tools. Hierarchy is the adaptive form for
ﬁnite intelligence to assume in the face of  complexity.
Simon explained how the complexity of  decision problems facing large ﬁrms cannot be
solved by the individual entrepreneur, as is the characteristic assumption of  the neoclassical
theory of  the ﬁrm. Instead, the organizational response to these problem-solving difﬁculties
is to divide decision-making tasks within the organization and use procedures to coordi-
nate and communicate smaller decisions in the pursuit of  large goals. This information
processing approach has been studied by a host of  researchers, especially early on by Jacob
Marschak and Roy Radner.6
In this paper, I abstract from informational concerns with decision-making, concen-
trating instead on the relationship between the capabilities of  coalitions and outcomes to
5Hierarchies also arise in the literature on property rights and incomplete contracts, where a fundamental
inability to write comprehensive contracts makes arms-length transactions less attractive in comparison to
direct control. See the seminal works of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), and Gibbons
(2005) for a survey on theories of  the ﬁrm.
6See Radner (1992) for a survey on hierarchies with a focus on the information processing approach. Other
important works in a similar vein include the communication network of Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) and
the knowledge-based hierarchy of Garicano (2000).
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understand what relational structures are compatible with the preferences of  actors (opera-
tionalized through the notion of  stability). The origins of  the decision hierarchies might be
multiple, but their persistence too deserves explanation.
The remainder of  the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I describe and explain
the formal framework, which I then use towards a theory of  hierarchical institutions in sec-
tion 3, where I also foray into an larger class of  institutional structures to demonstrate that
hierarchies are distinguished. In section 4, I take a non-cooperative approach and study a
take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game. I conclude in section 5. Some proofs are to be found in
the appendix, which also contains a section on useful comparative statics of  combinatorial
choice in matching and a section on the relationship between stability and the weaker notion
of  pairwise stability.
1.2 A Model of  Matching with Institutions
1.2.1 The Elements
Let I be the set of talents and (D(k))k2K be the collection of  the set of divisions in-
dexed by the set K, which is the set of  (local) institutions, where all these sets are disjoint
from each other. Associated with an institution k is a governance structure  k, which are
institutional-level rules and culture that determine how transactions involving institutional
members can be secured. In the background is the market governance structure, which
is the ambient framework within which talents and institutions conduct market transac-
tions. The market governance structure determines the security of  transactions between
talents and institutions, but is superceded by the institutional governance structure for intra-
institutional transactional details.
Transactions are modeled as bilateral contracts that describe the parties to the trans-
action as well as other details of  the transaction. A contract x will name one talent I(x) and
one institution K(x). A contract might also name one or more divisions from D(K(x)),
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but this, as with other intra-institutional details, are left free. Contracts are comprehensive in
the sense that they describe completely all talent-institution transactional matters.7 For a
given talent i and institution k, let X(i; k) be the set of  all possible contracts between them.
Then, X(i)  Sk2K X(i; k) is the collection of  all possible contracts involving talent i,
X(k)  Si2I X(i; k) is the collection of  all possible contracts involving institution k, and
X  Si2I Sk2K X(i; k) is the contract set for this economy, which is taken to be exogenous.
An institution transacts with potentially multiple talents in pursuit of  its goals, but a talent
transacts with at most one institution. Let X (i) be the collection of  subsets of X(i) that are
feasible for i, where the empty set ;, representing the outside option (being unmatched) for
i, is always assumed to be feasible. In keeping with the assumption that a talent can have at
most one contract with any institution, it must be that for any Y 2 X (i), jX(i)\Y j  1. We
will identify these singleton sets with the element they contain for notational convenience.8
If jX(i) \X(k)j = 1 for all i 2 I and k 2 K, then the contract set is classical.
Each talent i has strict preferences9 P i over the set of  feasible contracts X (i) naming
him. LetRi be the associated weak preference relation, where YRiY 0 if Y P iY 0 or Y = Y 0.
The choice behavior in a given choice situation Y  X(i) for a talent i is determined
by the preferences of  this talent.10 Let Ci denote the choice function of  talent i, deﬁned for
7To the extent that a contract encodes all the details of  a relationship that matter to either party, and that
the set of  contracts allows for every combination that could matter, this assumption is innocuous.
8 A brief  description of  notation is in order. An arbitrary map f from domain E to codomain F associates
each element e 2 E with a subset f(e)  F of  the codomain i.e. it is a correspondence. If  for all e 2 E,
jf(e)j = 1, then f is a function. I will use maps from a set to some other set (where typically one of  these two
sets is a subset of X ) to work with the relational information encoded in contracts, using the symbol for the
target set as the symbol for the mapping as well.
So, for any x 2 X , I(x) is the subset of  talents associated with contractx, andK(x) the subset of  institutions.
With this notation, the set of  all contracts in an arbitrary subset Y  X associated with some talent i 2 I by
Y (i) (the map is Y : I  Y ) is deﬁned by Y (i)  fy 2 Y  X : i 2 I(y)g. Another typical practice in this
paper will be the identiﬁcation of  singleton sets with the element it contains, as above. For any map f from
domain E to codomain F , the following extension of  this map over the domain 2E will also be denoted by f :
f(E0)  Se2E0 f(e) for every E0  E (note that f(;)  ;). Given a subset of  contracts Y  X , I(Y ) is the
subset of  talents associated with at least one contract in Y . Consider the following more complex example:
suppose we have two subsets of  contracts Y and Z, and we want to work with the set of  all contracts in Z that
name some talent that is named by some contract in Y . This is exactly Z(I(Y )), since I(Y ) is the set of  talent
that have a contract in Y , and Z(I 0) is the set of  all contracts that name a talent in the set I 0.
9A strict preference relation on a set is complete, asymmetric, transitive binary relation on that set. A weak
preference relation is a complete, reﬂexive, transitive binary relation.
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every possible choice situation Y  X(i), such that Ci(Y )  Y is feasible. The assumption
of  preference maximization is that Ci(Y )RiZ for all feasible Z  Y . Strict preferences
implies that the maximizer is unique and thus that choice functions are appropriate.
In keeping with the purpose of  building a model of  market behavior of  the institution,
we will focus on the choice behavior of  the institution with respect to contracts with talents.
A choice situation for k is a subset of  contracts Y  X(k), a set of  potential transactions
that is available to the institution. Because institutions are complex entities, composed of
many divisions with various interests, the choice behavior of  an institution is an emergent
phenomenon, shaped by the institutional governance structure  k that mediate the interests
of  these divisions. The ideal choice of  the institution in a given choice situation Y is a feasible
subset C  Y . But whence choice?
Towards the goal of  understanding institutional choice within the cooperative frame-
work, I recognize the workings of  the institution depend on the particulars of  its governance
structure and the interests of  its actors, with the choice behavior of  the institution in the
market being thereby determined. I model this theory of  the institution as follows: for every
division d 2 D(k), there is an associated domain of  interest X(d)  X(k) (domains of
interest of  different divisions may overlap). A division d has strict preferences Pd over sub-
sets of  contracts in its domain of  interest X(d). Fixing the collection of  domains of  interest
D(k)  fX(d)gd2D(k) and the preferences of  the divisions P(k)  fPdgd2D(k), the institu-
tional governance structure  k determines for every choice situation Y  X(k) the choice
of  the institution. LetCk be the institution’s derived choice, where the dependence on  k,
D(k), andP(k) has been suppressed. Choice behavior of  an institution does not necessarily
arise from the preference maximization of  a single preference relation, unlike a talent. To
the extent that a proﬁt function can be modeled as the preference relation of  a ﬁrm, the
neoclassical model of  the ﬁrm as a proﬁt-maximizer, while compatible with the framework
here, is not assumed.
10The assumption that the only determinant of  choice behavior is the preference relation is in keeping with
the spirit of  cooperative game theory and matching theory.
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1.2.2 Internal Assignments, Governance and Stability
Fix an institution k and take as given X(k) and fX(d)gd2D(k). Let Y  X(k) be a
choice situation for the institution k. The governance structure  k determines the institu-
tion’s choice from Y , Ck(Y ), via an internal assignment fY , which is a correspondence
from D(k) to Y such that the feasibility condition of  one contract per talent is satisﬁed:
jSd2D(k) fY (d) \ X(i)j  1. Any contract y 2 Y such that f 1Y (y) = ; is considered to
be unassigned at Y . A contract y 2 Y may contain terms that disallow certain divisions from
accessing this contract. For example, divisions may be geographical ofﬁces of  a ﬁrm and the
contract may specify geographical restrictions. Any such restrictions are respected by  k
and are formally captured by excluding the contract from the domain of  interest of  the dis-
allowed divisions. Thus, any internal assignment fY will respect these contract restrictions.
Let FY be the set of  all internal assignments given Y  X(k) and let F 
S
YX(k) FY
be the set of  all internal assignments. The institutional choice from Y given some internal
assignment fY is deﬁned as Ck(Y ; fY ) 
S
d2D(k) fY (d). Note that given Y , all unassigned
contracts are rejected from Y .
Given a choice situation Y and the list of  preferences of  divisions P(k), the governance
structure  k determines an internally stable assignment  k(Y;Pd) 2 FY .11 For this
paper I focus on governance structures that satisfy institutional efﬁciency i.e. for any Y ,
if fY is internally stable, then there does not exist f 0Y 2 FY such that f 0YRdfY for all d 2
D(k) and f 0YPdfY for some d. Let 	k be the family of  institutionally efﬁcient governance
structures for k.
1.2.3 Market Outcomes, Governance and Stability
For the sake of  notational convenience, I extend the deﬁnition of  choice functions for
talents and institutions to choice situations where contracts not naming them are present:
for any Y  X and for any j 2 I [K, Cj(Y )  Cj(Y (j)). So, for a choice situation the
11One could allow for multiple internally stable assignments but I focus in this paper on single-valuedness.
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only contracts that matter for j are those contracts that name it.
A market outcome (or allocation) is a feasible collection of  contracts A  X , i.e. for
all i 2 I , Y (i) 2 X (i). Let A be the set of  all feasible outcomes. I extend preferences of
talent from X (i) to A (keeping the same notation for the relations) as follows: for any i 2 I
and A;A0 2 A, AP (i)A0 if A(i)P (i)A0(i) and AR(i)A0 if A(i)R(i)A0(i). So, talents
are indifferent about the presence or absence of  contracts in an outcome that do not name
them.
The market governance structure within which talents and institutions transact deter-
mines what each of  these market participants are capable of  securing. That a talent is free to
contract with any institution, or not at all, is an outcome of  the market governance structure
enabling this. Similarly, that an institution may cancel a contract with a talent also reﬂects
the rules of  the marketplace. In matching theory, and cooperative game theory more gen-
erally, this is modeled by describing the way in which a market outcome can be blocked or
dominated. Thus, any market outcome that is not blocked is considered to be consonant with
the rules of  market governance, and is considered stable. An important question is whether
a given market governance structure, together with the interests and behavior of  the market
participants, allows for stable market outcomes.
An outcomeA is individually rational for talent i ifA(i)R(i) ;. This captures the no-
tion that i is not compelled to participate in the market by holding a contract that he prefers
less than his outside option. An outcome A is institutionally blocked by institution k if
Ck(A(k)) 6= A(k). This captures the notion that k can unilaterally sever relationships with
some talent without disturbing relationships with other talents and that the outcome has to
be consistent with internally stable assignments. An outcome A is institutionally stable
if  it is not institutionally blocked by any institution. An outcome A is individually stable
if  it is individually rational for all talent and institutionally stable at every institution.
An outcome A is pairwise blocked if  there exists a contract x 2 XnA such that
the talent I(x) strictly prefers outcome A [ fxg to A and the institution K(x) will choose
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this contract from A [ fxg, that is x 2 CI(x)(A [ fxg) and x 2 CK(x)(A [ fxg). This
captures the notion that the possibility of  a new mutually chosen relationship will upset an
outcome, and so the initial outcome is not secure. An outcome A is pairwise stable if  it
is individually stable and it is not pairwise blocked.
An outcome A is setwise blocked if  there exists a blocking set of  contracts Z  XnA
such that every talent i 2 I(Z) strictly prefers A [ Z to A and every institution k 2 K(Z)
will choose all its contracts in Z from choice situation A [ Z i.e. for all i 2 I(Z), Z(i) 2
Ci(A [ Z) and for all k 2 K(Z), Z(k)  Ck(A [ Z). This captures the notion that the
possibility of  a collection of  new relationships that would be chosen if  available together with
existing relationships will upset an allocation. An outcome A is stable if  it is individually
stable and it is not setwise blocked.
An outcome A is dominated by A0 via J , where A0 is an alternate outcome and J 
I [K is a deviating coalition, if
1. the deviating coalition’s contracts in the alternate outcome is different from that in
the original allocation: A0(J) 6= A(J).
2. every deviating actor j 2 J holds contracts with other deviating actors only: for all
i 2 J \ I , K(A0(i)) 2 J , and for all k 2 J \K, I(A0(k))  J .
3. every deviating actor j 2 J would choose its contracts in the alternate outcome A0
over those in the original outcome: for all i 2 J \ I , C i(A [ A0) = A0 and for all
k 2 J \K, Ck(A [ A0) = A0.
An outcome A is in the core (is core stable) if  there does not exist another outcome that
dominates it via some coalition.
The concept of  pairwise stability was ﬁrst introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962), in a
setting where pairwise stability and (setwise) stability coincide. Like the cooperative game
concept of  the core, the solution concept of  stability appeals to outcomes of  the economy
to generate predictions, without considering strategic aspects that require the level of  detail
common in non-cooperative game theory. The stability concepts are closer in spirit to the
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concept of  competitive equilibrium; in the stability concept the choice situation is taken
as given just as in the competitive equilibrium concept the prices are taken as given (see
Ostrovsky (2008) for an elaboration of  this argument in the context of  supply chain markets).
In the present setting of  many-to-one matching, the set of  core outcome and the set of
stable outcome coincides. This is the content of  the following lemma, analogues12 of  which
have been proved in many-to-one matching settings where choice is generated by preferences
for all market participants.
Lemma 1.1. An outcome is in the core if  and only if  it is stable.
Proof. First, we will show that every stable outcome is in the core, by proving the contra-
positive. Suppose A is dominated by A0 via coalition J . Suppose J contains no institution.
Then, every deviating talent receives his outside option, and by domination requirement 1
at least one of  these deviators held a different contract in A than the null contract ; in A0.
Pick one such talent i 2 J . Then A is not individually rational for i and so A is not stable.
Instead, suppose J contains at least one institution k. If  every institution holds exactly the
same set of  contracts in A0 and A, then we are back to the case where at least one worker
holds a different contract in A and A0. Moreover, it must be the case, given all k 2 J \K
hold the same contracts in A and A0, that this one worker holds the null contract in A0, and
so again we have that A is not individually rational for this worker and hence not stable. So,
in the ﬁnal case, we have at least one institution k 2 J and moreover this institution holds
different contracts in A and A0. Then the set of  contracts Z  A0(k) constitutes a block
of A, since domination condition 3 implies Ck(A [ Z) = Z and Ci(A [ Z) = Z for any
i 2 I(Z), proving A is not stable.
Second, we will show that every core outcome is stable, by proving the contrapositive.
Suppose A is setwise blocked by Z  XnA. Deﬁne J  I(Z) [ K(Z) and for each
j 2 J , deﬁne Bj  Cj(A [ Z). Deﬁne A0 

AnSj2J A(j) [ Sj2J Bj. Note that
12See Echenique and Oviedo (2004) for a proof  of  this in the classic many-to-one matching model, and see
Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005) for a similar statement.
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A0 is an outcome by construction. Now, deﬁne J 0  I  Sk2K\J(BjnZ); these are the
talents not in the blocking coalition J whose contracts with blocking institutions are chosen
after the block. There is no analogous set of  institutions, since the unit-demand condition of
talents’ preferences implies that blocking talents do not hold any contracts with non-blocking
institutions after the block. It follows from the construction of A0 that A is dominated by A0
via coalition J [ J 0.
This coincidence of  the more widely-known concept of  the core with the matching so-
lution concept of  stability supports the argument that stability is an important condition for
market outcomes to satisfy. In the Walrasian model of  markets, similar results relating the
core to the competitive equilibrium lend support to the latter as a market outcome. While
in that setting equivalence of  the two does not hold generally, the core convergence result
of Debreu and Scarf (1963) shows that in sufﬁciently large markets every core outcome can
be supported as a competitive equilibrium outcome and vice versa, and provides a proof
of  the Edgeworth conjecture. Similar large market results have been obtained in matching
models.13
1.2.4 Conditions on Preferences and Choice
Certain conditions on choice are needed to ensure existence of  stable outcomes in many-
to-one matching models.14 Perhaps the most important of  these conditions is substitutability.
Deﬁnition 1.1 (Substitutability). A choice functionCk on domainX(k) satisﬁes substitutability
if  for any z; x 2 X(k) and Y  X(k), z 62 Ck(Y [ fzg) implies z 62 Ck(Y [ fz; xg).
Substitutability, introduced in its earliest form by Kelso and Crawford (1982), is sufﬁ-
cient for the existence of  stable outcomes in many-to-one matching models when choice is
determined by preferences, both in the classical models without contracts and in the more
13See Kojima and Pathak (2009) and Azevedo and Leshno (2012).
14For the sake of  collecting deﬁnitions in one subsection, I deﬁne and discuss the important conditions on
choice that will be used in this paper. The reader may wish to skip these and proceed to the next section on
hierarchical institutions, using this subsection as a useful reference.
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general framework with contracts, this last result due to Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005). In
addition, the set of  stable matchings has a lattice structure, with two extremal stable match-
ings, each distinguished by simultaneously being the most preferred stable matching of  one
side and the least preferred stable matching of  the other side.
Substitutability has also proved useful as a sufﬁcient condition for existence of  weakly
setwise stable outcomes in the many-to-many matching with contracts model, a concept in-
troduced and studied in Klaus and Walzl (2009). These authors follow the early literature in
assuming that contracts are comprehensive, so that any pair has at most one contract with
each other in an outcome. Hatﬁeld and Kominers (2012a) instead assume that a pair may
have multiple contracts with each other in an outcome and show that substitutability is sufﬁ-
cient under their deﬁnition of  stability.15 Substitutability is not sufﬁcient for existence of  out-
comes that satisfy a solution concept stronger than weak setwise stability, though Echenique
and Oviedo (2006) show that strengthening the condition for one side to strong substitutes
restores existence for this stability notion in the classical setting.
While providing the maximal Cartesian domain for existence of  stable outcomes in the
classical many-to-one matching model (the college admissions model), substitutability is not
the weakest condition ensuring existence of  stable outcomes in many-to-one matching with
contracts. Hatﬁeld and Kojima (2010) provide a weaker substitutability condition that en-
sures existence of  stable outcomes in models with preferences as primitives.
Deﬁnition 1.2 (Bilateral Substitutability). A choice function Ck on domain X(k) satisﬁes bi-
lateral substitutability if  for any z; x 2 X(k) and Y  X(k) with I(z) 62 I(Y ) and
I(x) 62 I(Y ), z 62 Ck(Y [ fzg) implies z 62 Ck(Y [ fz; xg).
Bilateral substitutability guarantees existence in the many-to-one setting, but the struc-
ture of  the stable set is no longer a lattice, and extremal outcomes need not exist. Hatﬁeld
15The stability deﬁnition of Hatﬁeld and Kominers (2012a) coincides with the weak setwise stability of Klaus
and Walzl (2009) under the assumption of  comprehensive contracts (which Kominers (2012) call unitarity),
but is stronger under the assumption of  non-comprehensive contracts. They also prove that substitutability
provides a maximal Cartesian domain for existence of  stable outcomes, with the caveat that contracts are not
comprehensive.
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and Kojima (2010) provide an intermediate condition, unilateral substitutability, that re-
stores the existence of  one of  the extremal stable outcome, the doctor-optimal stable out-
come, which is simultaneously the hospital-pessimal stable outcome.16
Deﬁnition 1.3 (Unilateral Substitutability). A choice function Ck on domain X(k) satisﬁes uni-
lateral substitutability if  for any z; x 2 X(k) and Y  X(k) with I(z) 62 I(Y ), z 62
Ck(Y [ fzg) implies z 62 Ck(Y [ fz; xg).
Bilateral substitutability does not provide a maximal Cartesian domain for sufﬁciency
of  existence, unlike substitutability in the college admissions model. Hatﬁeld and Kojima
(2008) introduced the weak substitutes condition, which mimics substitutability for a unitary
set of  contracts, deﬁned to be a set in which no talent has more than one contract present.
The authors show that any Cartesian domain of  preferences that guarantees existence of
stable outcomes must satisfy weak substitutability.
Deﬁnition 1.4 (Weak Substitutability). A choice function Ck on domain X(k) satisﬁes weak
substitutability if  for any z; x 2 X(k) and Y  X(k) with I(z) 62 I(Y ), I(x) 62 I(Y ) and
jI(Y )j = jY j, z 62 Ck(Y [ fzg) implies z 62 Ck(Y [ fz; xg).
The common assumption about choice behavior in the matching literature has been that
agents choose by maximizing a preference relation or objects are allocated while respecting a
priority relation. With the deﬁnition of  stability introduced in Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005),
however, one that makes reference only to choice functions, it is no longer necessary to make
reference to underlying preferences for the model to be studied, since substitutability is a
condition on choice functions as well. For this more abstract setting however, substitutability
is no longer a sufﬁcient condition for existence, as shown by Aygün and Sönmez (2012b).
These authors introduce the Irrelevance of  Rejected Contracts condition on choice that
restores the familiar results of  matching models under substitutable preferences, such as the
lattice structure and the opposition of  interests at extremal matchings.
16In their setting, doctors are the talents who can hold only one contract in an outcome and hospitals are the
institutions which can hold many contracts in an outcome. Moreover, hospitals have preferences as primitives
that deﬁne choice behavior.
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Deﬁnition 1.5 (Irrelevance of  Rejected Contracts). A choice function Ck on domain X(k)
satisﬁes the Irrelevance of Rejected Contracts (IRC) condition if  for any Y  X(k) and
z 2 X(k)nY , z 62 Ck(Y [ fzg) implies Ck(Y [ fzg) = Ck(Y ).
Choice derived from preferences must satisfy the Strong Axiom of  Revealed Preference
(SARP)17, and it is the combination of  this choice assumption and substitutability that yields
the results of Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005). However, under the substitutes condition, IRC is
no weaker than SARP. However, the IRC condition is also sufﬁcient to restore all the results
of Hatﬁeld and Kojima (2010) under the weaker substitutes conditions introduced therein,
and Aygün and Sönmez (2012a) also show that in this setting IRC is strictly weaker than
SARP.
While substitutability and unilateral substitutability are strong enough conditions to pro-
vide useful structure on the stable set, particularly in ensuring the existence of  a talent-
optimal stable outcome, they are not strong enough to yield the result that a strategyproof
mechanism exists for this domain, a result that is familiar from the college admissions model
with responsive preferences. Hatﬁeld and Milgrom (2005) show that under a condition on
choice they call Law of  Aggregate Demand, a generalized version of  the Gale-Shapley De-
ferred Acceptance algorithm serves as a strategyproof  mechanism for talent.
Deﬁnition 1.6 (Law of  Aggregate Demand). A choice function Ck on domain X(k) satisﬁes the
law of aggregate demand (LAD) if  for any Y; Y 0  X(k), Y  Y 0 implies jCk(Y )j 
jCk(Y 0)j.
Alkan (2002) introduced the analog of  this condition, cardinal monotonicity, for the classical
matching model to prove a version of  the rural hospital theorem18. He demonstrates that with
cardinal monotonicity, in every stable matching every agent is matched to the same number
17 In a matching setting, where choice is combinatorial, a choice function C with domain X satis-
ﬁes the Strong Axiom of  Revealed Preference (SARP) if  there does not exist a sequence of  distinct
X1; : : : ; Xn; Xn+1 = X1, Xm  X , with Ym  C(Xm) and Ym  Xm \Xm+1 for all m 2 1; : : : ; n.
18Roth (1986) showed that in the college admissions model with responsive preferences, any college that
does not ﬁll its capacity in some stable matching then in every stable matching it is matched to exactly the
same set of  students.
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of  partners. The analog for the contracts setting is that under the Law of  Aggregate Demand,
every institution holds the same number of  contracts in every stable outcome.
One last condition that will prove useful in the later section on a decentralized bargaining
game is the condition of  Pareto Separable choice.
Deﬁnition 1.7 (Pareto Separable). A choice function C of  an institution k (or division d) is Pareto
Separable if, for any i 2 I and distinct x; x0 2 X(i; k), x 2 C(Y [ fx; x0g) for some Y  X(k)
implies that x0 62 C(Y 0 [ fx; x0g) for any Y 0  X(k).
Hatﬁeld and Kojima (2010) prove that substitutability is equivalent to unilateral substi-
tutability and the Pareto Separable condition. A partial analog to this result is that weak
substitutability and the Pareto Separable condition is equivalent to bilateral substitutability,
though the converse is not true.
Proposition 1.1. Suppose institution k has a choice function C satisfying IRC, weak substitutes and
the Pareto Separable condition. Then C satisﬁes bilateral substitutes.
The Pareto Separable condition states that if  in a choice situation some contract with a
talent is not chosen but an alternative contract with this talent is, then in any other choice
situation where the alternative is present the ﬁrst cannot be chosen. So, in particular, suppose
a new contract with a new talent becomes available and is chosen. With the Pareto Separable
assumption, we can conclude that there cannot be any renegotiation with held talents, since such a
renegotiation would involve a violation of  this assumption. Therefore, given the assumption
of  IRC, we can remove these unchosen alternatives with talents held in the original choice
situation without altering choice behavior. Moreover, IRC allows us to remove any contracts
with talents who are not chosen in either the original situation or in the new situation with the
arrival of  a previously unseen talent. Thus, we can reduce the set of  available contracts in the
original situation to contain no more than one contract per talent. Thus, if  any previously
rejected talent (or contract) is recalled with the arrival of  a new talent (violating bilateral
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substitutes), then this behavior would prevail in the pruned choice situation, resulting in a
violation of  weak substitutes. This argument is formalized in the following proof.
Proof. Let Y  X(k) and z; x 2 X(k)nY such that z 6= x and I(z) 6= I(x). Moreover,
suppose I(z); I(x) 62 I(Y ). Suppose z 62 C(Y [ fzg). Now, suppose z 2 C(Y [ fz; xg),
which constitutes a violation of  bilateral substitutability. First, suppose there exist w 2 Y
such that w 62 C(Y [ fzg) and w 62 C(Y [ fz; xg). Then by IRC we can remove w
from Y without affecting choice i.e. C(Y 0 [ fzg) = C(Y [ fzg) and C(Y 0 [ fz; xg) =
C(Y 0 [fz; xg). Repeatedly delete such contracts, and let Y 0 denote the set remaining after
all such deletions from Y .
If  there exist y; y0 2 Y 0 with I(y) = I(y0) such that y 2 C(Y 0 [ fzg) and y0 2
C(Y 0 [ fz; xg), then C would violate the Pareto Separable condition, given that no more
than one contract with I(y) can be chosen. Thus, if y 2 C(Y 0 [ fzg) then for any y0 2 Y 0
with I(y0) = I(y), y0 62 C(Y 0 [ fz; xg). So, by IRC, C(Y 00 [ fzg) = C(Y 0 [ fzg) and
C(Y 00 [ fz; xg) = C(Y 0 [ fz; xg), where Y 00 = Y 0nfy0g. We can repeat this deletion
procedure and let Y 00 denote the set remaining after all such deletions from Y .
It should be clear that jY 00j = jI(Y 00)j. Moreover, we have that z 62 C(Y 00 [ fzg) but
z 2 C(Y 00 [ fz; xg), constituting a violation of  weak substitutes, and concluding our proof.
1.3 The Theory of  Hierarchical Institutions
In this section, I deﬁne and examine a particular institutional governance structure, the
inclusive hierarchical governance structure. Unlike the market governance structure, which is a
rather permissive type of  governance structure that allows talents and institutions to freely re-
contract, inclusive hierarchical governance structures greatly enhance the bargaining power
of  divisions versus talents. The view taken in this section is that talents are human resources
to be allocated within the institution, and the institutional governance structures considered
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reﬂects this aim. The inclusive hierarchical governance structure provides talents with weak
veto power since they can leave any contract with the institution for another institution, is in-
stitutionally efﬁcient since there does not exist any internal assignment of  contracts to divisions
that is weakly improving for every division and strictly improving for some, and is situationally
strategyproof since for a ﬁxed take-it-or-leave-it choice situation every division has a dominant
strategy reveal its preferences when the governance structure  is viewed as a mechanism.
Proofs of  results can be found in the appendix.
1.3.1 The Inclusive Hierarchical Governance Structure
A governance structure  2 	k has a hierarchy if  it is parametrized by a linear order
Bk on D(k). Inclusive Hierarchical (IH) governance structures constitute a class of
governance structures where the hierarchy Bk determines how conﬂicts between divisions
over contracts are resolved, and where divisions have the power to choose contracts without
approval of  other divisions, except in the case of  conﬂicts for talents already mentioned. For
example, given a choice situation Y , if  there is a contract y 2 Y such that distinct divisions
d; d0 2 D(k) both have y as part of  their most preferred bundle of  contracts in Y , then the
governance structure resolves this conﬂict in favor of  the division with higher rank, where
dBk d0 means that division d has a higher rank than d0. However, if  given any two divisions
their most preferred bundles in Y are such that there is no conﬂict over a contracts or talents,
then the divisions have the autonomy to choose these bundles on behalf  of  the institution.
The order Bk deﬁnes a ranking of  divisions, where division d is said to be higher-ranked than
division d0 if dBkd0, where d; d0 2 D(k) for some institution k. Since it should not cause any
confusion, let Bk : D(k) ! f1; : : : ; jD(k)jg be the rank function, where Bk(d) < Bk(d0)
if  and only if d Bk d0. Also, for any n 2 f1; : : : ; jD(k)jg, let dkn denote the n-th ranked
division i.e. Bk(dkn) = n.19
The inclusive hierarchical governance structure  k parametrized byBk can be modeled
19A division d higher-ranked than another division d0 if  and only if  its rank numberBk(d) is smaller Bk(d0).
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using the following choice aggregation procedure, the inclusionary hierarchical proce-
dure. This procedure determines the internal assignment of  contracts for a given choice
situation Y  X(k), and thence the derived institutional choice Ck(Y ). The procedure is
analogous to a serial dictatorship in the resource allocation literature, with the hierarchyBk
serving as the serial ordering. The highest ranked division dk1 is assigned its most preferred
set of  contracts from Y . The next highest ranked division dk2 is assigned its most preferred
set of  contracts from the remain set of  contracts, and so on. Importantly, after a division’s
assignment is determined, any unassigned contracts that name a talent assigned at this step
are removed (though still unassigned), and the remaining contracts constitute the availability
set for the next step. At every step, the assignment must be feasible, so that no division d is
assigned a contract outside of  its domain of  interest X(d).
The formal description of  the procedure requires some notation. Let Y  X(k) be a
subset of  contracts naming the institution k. There areNk = jD(k)j steps in the procedure.
For the sake of  notational convenience and readability, I will suppress dependence on the
institution k, which will be ﬁxed. For any n 2 f1; : : : ; Ng, let Yn be the set of  contracts
available at step n, let Yn be the set of  contracts available and allowed at step n, Yn be the set of
contracts available and not allowed at step n, Yn be the set of  contracts assigned at step n, Yn be
the set of  contracts eliminated at step n, and Yn be the set of  contracts rejected at step n.
Step 1 Deﬁne Y1  Y . Deﬁne Y1  Y1 \ X(d1), Y1  Y1 nY1 , Y1  Cd1(Y1 ), Y1  
Y1 \X(I(Y1 ))
 nY1 , and Y1  Y1 n(Y1 [ Y1 ).
...
Step n Deﬁne Yn  (Yn 1nYn 1) [ Yn 1. Deﬁne Yn  Yn \X(dn), Yn  Yn nYn , Yn 
Cdn(Yn ), Yn 
 
Yn \X(I(Yn ))
 nYn , and Yn  Yn n(Yn [ Yn ).
The internal assignment fY (d) of  division d 2 D(k) given a choice situation Y is fY (d) =
YBk(d). The derived institutional choice C
k(Y ) from set Y is deﬁned by Ck(Y )  SNkn=1 Yn .
Note that both fY and Ck(Y ) depend upon the hierarchy Bk.
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Division 1 Division 2 Division 3
γ γ γ
Y λ λ λ
C(Y)
R(Y)
δ δ δ
ρ ρ ρ
β\δ β\δ β\δ
Institution k
Figure 1.1: Graphical Depiction of  a Hierarchical Institution with three Divisions, with the
various contract-pathways of  the Inclusionary Hierarchical Procedure displayed.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the inclusionary hierarchical procedure for an institution with three
divisions. In this case, the choice procedure has three steps, one for each division. One can
imagine that the set of  contracts available to the institution “ﬂow” through the institution
along the “paths” illustrated, where divisions “split” the ﬂow into various components that
then travel along different paths. Some of  these paths meet at a “union junction” (every
junction in this ﬁgure is a union junction); some paths lead to a division of  the institution.
The paths form an “acyclic network” beginning at the “entry port” of  the institution and
ending at either the “acceptance port” or “rejection port”, and so every contract that enters
the institution will exit after encountering a ﬁnite number of  nodes. While this descrip-
tion choice is not meant to be taken literally, it is a useful mnemonic for understanding the
forthcoming results.
In summary, for any choice situation Y  X(k), the internal assignment f that is in-
ternally stable given an inclusive hierarchical governance structure  k with hierarchy Bk
coincides with the assignment
 
Yn
Nk
n=1
produced by the corresponding inclusionary hierar-
chical procedure.
1.3.2 Properties of  Inclusive Hierarchical Governance
I now turn to answering the main question posed by this paper: why hierarchies? In this
subsection I will demonstrate that inclusive hierarchical governance structures have the pos-
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itive property that the institutional choice function derived from the internally stable assign-
ment satisﬁes two key choice properties, the Irrelevance of  Rejected Contracts and bilateral
substitutability, under the assumption that divisions have bilaterally substitutable prefer-
ences. This important result will then straightforwardly lead to the theorem that markets
featuring institutions with inclusive hierarchical governance are guaranteed to have stable
outcomes. Other interesting results about this governance structure will also be discussed.
Fix an institution k with divisions D(k), where (Pd)d2D(k) are the preferences of  each
division, which respect the domain of  interest restrictions D(k).20 Let  k be the inclusive
hierarchical governance structure of k, parameterized by Bk. In order to ease exposition
and readability, I will suppress notation indicating the institution. Thus, for the purposes of
this subsection, we will denote X(k), the set of  all contracts naming institution k, simply by
X , and D(k), the set of  all divisions in k, simply by D.
The ﬁrst property of  inclusive hierarchical choice aggregation is that the IRC property
of  division choice will be preserved at the institutional level. As discussed previously, this
condition states that the presence of  “dominated” contracts in particular choice situation
has no bearing on the choice, and so their removal from the available set does not alter the
chosen set.
Theorem 1.1. The institutional choice function C derived from the inclusive hierarchical governance
structure parametrized by Bk satisﬁes the IRC condition if  for every division d 2 D, Cd satisﬁes the IRC
condition.
The following theorem is the key choice property with inclusive hierarchical governance.
The property of  bilateral substitutes is preserved by aggregation, given that divisional choice
satisﬁes it and IRC.
Theorem 1.2. The institutional choice function C derived from the inclusive hierarchical governance
structure parametrized byBk satisﬁes bilateral substitutes if  for every division d 2 D, Cd satisﬁes bilateral
20The results of  this subsection also hold if  division choice is taken to be primitive with the additional
assumption of  IRC.
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substitutes and the IRC condition.
The important observation in the proof  is that an expansion of  the choice situation
through the introduction of  a contract with a new or unchosen talent improves the array
of  contract options for every division in the institution, and not just for the highest-ranked
division, given the assumptions of  bilateral substitutability and IRC of  division choice.
It is also the case that choice aggregation with inclusive hierarchies preserves the property
of  weak substitutes.
Proposition 1.2. The institutional choice function C derived from the inclusive hierarchical governance
structure parametrized by Bk satisﬁes weak substitutes if  for every division d 2 D, Cd satisﬁes weak
substitutes and the IRC condition.
The proof  follows a similar strategy to that of  Theorem 1.2, showing a monotonic rela-
tionship between certain choice situations of  the institution and the resultant choice situa-
tions of  each division.
Intriguingly, this preservation by inclusive hierarchical aggregation does not hold when
divisions have substitutable choice, as shown by Kominers and Sönmez (2012) in the slot-
speciﬁc priorities model, where slots are analogous to unit-demand divisions and the order
of  precedence is analogous to the institutional hierarchy. They provide an example where
institutional choice violates substitutes and unilateral substitutes with two divisions of  unit-
demand. These authors also obtain results that correspond to Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 and
Proposition 1.2. It is also the case that the unilateral substitutes property cannot be preserved
through this aggregation. Thus, bilateral substitutes is the strongest substitutability property
that is preserved through inclusive hierarchical governance.
That the property of  weak substitutes is preserved through aggregation leads naturally
to the following result for the classical matching setting, since weak substitutes is a property
that places conditions on choice in situations where no talent has more than one contract
available.
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Proposition 1.3. IfX(k) is a classical contract set and ifCd satisﬁes Subs and IRC for all d 2 D(k),
then Ck satisﬁes Subs and IRC.
Another novel result of  the inclusive hierarchical procedure is that SARP is preserved.
Thus, in the baseline case where divisions are assumed to have preferences, the institutional
choice can in fact be rationalized by some preference relation. Nevertheless, as shown in
Aygün and Sönmez (2012a), there exist unilaterally substitutable choice functions that satisfy
IRC and the law of  aggregate demand that violate the SARP, and so if  divisional choice
was not generated by preferences it could well be that the institutional choice cannot be
rationalized either.
Theorem 1.3. The institutional choice function C derived from the inclusive hierarchical governance
structure parametrized by Bk satisﬁes SARP if  for every division d 2 D, Cd satisﬁes SARP.
The following is an example of  a bilaterally substitutable and IRC choice function that
cannot be decomposed into a sequential dictatorship of  unit-demand divisions with strict
preference relations. In fact, it cannot be non-trivially generated by an institution with at
least two divisions with bilaterally substitutable choice functions.
Example 1.1. Suppose we have a choice function C deﬁned as follows:
C(;) = ;
C(x) = x C(x0) = x0 C(z) = z C(z0) = z0
C(fx; x0g) = x C(fx; zg) = x C(fx; z0g) = x
C(fx0; zg) = z C(fx0; z0g) = fx0; z0g C(fz; z0g) = z
C(fx; x0; zg) = x C(fx; x0; z0g) = fx0; z0g C(fx; z; z0g) = x C(fx0; z; z0g) = fx0; z0g
C(fx; x0; z; z0g) = fx0; z0g
Contracts x and x0 are with talent tx and contracts z and z0 are with talent tz.
Since x0 and z0 are selected from the largest offer set, one of  these two contracts must
be the highest priority (amongst contracts with these two talents) for the division with the
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highest rank that ever holds a contract with any one of  these two talents. Without loss of
generality, suppose it is x0. Then, since x0 will always be picked by this division over any
contract with talents tx; tz, if  available, it must be that contract x0 is never rejected. But this
is not the case for choice function C, proving that this choice function cannot be generated
by a sequential dictatorship of  unit-demand divisions.
The key feature of  this example is that fx0; z0g are complementary. This is illustrated by
supposing there are two divisions d and d0, where dBd0, with preferences fx0; z0g d ; and
x d0 z0 d0 z d0 x0 d0 ;; the institutional choice function is identical to C. However, in
this case, the choice function of  the ﬁrst division does not satisfy bilateral substitutes (in fact,
violates weak substitutes). Furthermore, there does not exist any non-trivial institution with
at least two divisions that generates this choice function. Thus, we have shown that there
exist bilaterally substitutable choice functions that cannot be generated from a non-trivial
inclusive hierarchy with bilaterally substitutable divisions.
Proposition 1.4. In the setting with classical contracts, if Cd satisﬁes substitutability and the LAD
for every d 2 D and the set of  acceptable talents X(d) is the same for every division, then with inclusive
hierarchical governance the derived choice function C satisﬁes substitutability and LAD.
Proof. Let Y  X and z 2 XnY . Deﬁne Z  Y [ fzg. The ﬁrst thing to note is that Cd
satisﬁes IRC since it satisﬁes Subs and LAD. Thus, from Proposition 1.1, C satisﬁes IRC.
Thus, if x 62 C(Z), then C(Z) = C(Y ) and so the condition for LAD is satisﬁed. So,
suppose z 2 C(Z). Now, consider the ﬁrst division according to B. If z is rejected, then
the division chooses exactly the same contracts it would choose with z present, and so the
cardinality of  the set of  contracts rejected by the division increases by exactly one, and the
cardinality of  the chosen set stays the same. If z is accepted, then by the Subs condition,
every previously rejected contract remains rejected and by LAD the cardinality of  the chosen
set does not decrease. Thus, these restrictions imply that at most one previously chosen
contract is now rejected due to the acceptance of z, and so the set of  contracts rejected by
the ﬁrst division increases by at most one contract. Next, suppose that the set of  contracts
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rejected increases by at most one for every division up to and including k. Then, the previous
argument can be repeated to show that the set of  rejected contracts increases by at most one,
thereby demonstrating that that set of  contracts which are unchosen using C increases in
cardinality by at most one, and so we have that C satisﬁes LAD.
Corollary 1.1. In the setting with classical contracts, if  every division d 2 D has unit-demand with
strict preferences and the set of  acceptable talents is the same for every division, then C satisﬁes Subs and
LAD.
Proof. This follows from the observation that the condition of  unit-demand with strict pref-
erences induces a substitutable choice function for the division satisfying LAD, combined
with the previous proposition.
1.3.3 On Markets and Hierarchies
With the results of  the previous subsection, we know that an institution with an inclusive
hierarchy will have a derived choice function that satisﬁes the properties of  IRC and bilat-
eral substitutability, amongst other properties. Consider now an economy with some set of
institutions K, each of  which is organized by an inclusive hierarchy of  divisions, and some
set of  talents I and some set of  contracts X . The key existence result for this economy is
that the set of  stable market outcomes, and so the core, is nonempty.
Theorem 1.4. If  for every institution k 2 K the choice functions Cd of  every division d 2 D(k)
satisﬁes IRC and bilateral substitutability, then the set of  stable market outcomes is nonempty.
Proof. By Theorem 1.2, we know that choice function of  every institution satisﬁes IRC and
bilateral substitutability. Then by Theorem 1 of Hatﬁeld and Kojima (2010), the conditions
of  which are satisﬁed by the talent-institution matching economy, the set of  stable outcomes
is nonempty.
The existence of  a market stable outcome means that there does not exist any group of
talents and divisions that can ﬁnd an arrangement each of  them prefers that is institution-
28
ally stable. It may be the case that some talent and division wish to hold a contract with
each other, but this does not block the market outcome because the institution to which the
division belongs prevents such a block from being secure. As we shall see in the next sub-
section, it is a property of  inclusive hierarchical governance that a market stable outcome
exists, and not merely that there is an institutional governance structure, even though the
presence of  a governance structure can limit the types of  blocks to market outcomes that
might be possible.
1.3.4 Non-Hierarchical Conﬂict Resolution
With inclusive hierarchical governance in institution k, conﬂicts between divisions over
contracts are resolved through hierarchical rankingBk, with division d obtaining a favorable
resolution in any dispute with division d0 if  and only if d Bk d0. In this subsection, I will
consider a more ﬂexible conﬂict resolution system, where conﬂicts over a particular contract
are resolved in a manner that is dependent on the contract in question.
Fix an institution k and now suppose that there exists a collection
 
Bkx

x2X(k) of  linear
order on D(k). The role of  any order Bkx in the institutional governance is to determine
which division can claim contract x in a conﬂict between two or more divisions. Given
some choice situation Y  X(k) and contract x 2 Y , if  for some distinct d; d0 2 D(k) with
d Bkx d0, x 2 X(d) \X(d0), and if x 2 Cd(Y ) \ Cd0(Y ), then the divisions are in conﬂict
over x. This conﬂict is resolved in favor of  the division with the higher rank according to
Bkx, which in this case is d, which means that an internal assignment f where x is assigned
to d0, x 2 f(d0), and d would choose x given its assignment i.e. x 2 Cd(f(d) [ fxg) is a
disputed assignment and so not internally stable.
Let  k be an internally efﬁcient governance structure parametrized by a ﬂexible conﬂict
resolution system
 
Bkx

x2X(k). The requirement of  internal efﬁciency, which is the condition
that in any choice situation Y  X(k) there is no feasible internal allocation g such that
g(d)Rdf(d) for all divisions d 2 D(k) and g(d)Pdf(d) for some division d 2 D(k), where
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f   k(Y; (Pd)d2D(k)).
Theorem 1.5. Suppose the contracts is classical. If  all divisions are unit-demand and the institutional
governance structure k is internally efﬁcient and has a ﬂexible conﬂict resolution system, then the institutional
choice satisﬁes IRC but can violate substitutability.
Proof. For the institution k in question, let Y  X(k) be the set of  contracts available to it,
and let z 2 X(k)nY . Deﬁne Y^  Y [ fzg.
Given the hierarchical priority structure at situation Y ,H(Y ), we can use the hierarchi-
cal exchange mechanism  with H(Y ) to get an assignment of  contracts to divisions  by
using the preferences of  the divisions as an input to .
Some notation: I assume there is some ﬁxed exogenous tie-breaking rule that determines
the order in which cycles are removed in the situation where there are multiples cycles, so
that only one cycle is removed per step, where such a rule always removes older cycles before
younger ones. In particular, I use an exogenous ordering of  the divisions to determine the
ordering of  cycles to be removed when there are multiple cycles at a step, where the cycles
at a step are ordered for removal as follows. There is a queue for cycle removal. In every
step, have all divisions point to their favorite available contract. Order all cycles that newly
appear in this step by cycle-removal order and place it into the removal queue, where a new
cycle enters the queue before another new cycle if  it has a division in the cycle that is cycle-
removal-smaller than every agent in the other cycle. Then, remove in this round the the
cycle at the front of  the queue. Update the control rights of  any contracts whose previously
controlling division has been assigned and removed. Go to the next step.
Note that in every step, if  the queue as any cycles remaining, one cycle is removed,
though it is not the case that in every step new cycles are created. However, in any step
where the queue is empty at the beginning of  the step, a new cycle must be created if  there
are any divisions remaining. Let T (Y ) be number of  steps for all divisions to be assigned or
removed.
Let (t(Y ))t2T (Y ) be the sequence of  trading cycles realized by the mechanism when
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the set of  available contracts is Y . Then, C(Y )  St2T (Y )X(t(Y )). Also, (t(Y ))t2T (Y )
determines the internal allocation Y .
Now, let us study what occurs when a new contract z is introduced. Since the hierar-
chical priority structure is contract-consistent, every contract y 2 Y has the same division
controlling it in H(Y ) and H(Y^ ). Let d be the division that controls z at Y^ .
To demonstrate that C satisﬁes IRC, we will assume that z 62 C(Y^ ) and prove that
C(Y^ ) = C(Y ). Given that z 62 C(Y^ ), z 62 t(Y^ ) for any t 2 T (Y^ ). Since the only way
that z is removed from the assignment procedure is by removal via a trading cycle and since
a division that does not have z in its domain of  interest is not allowed to point to it, we know
that no division could have pointed to z at any step. Thus, in every step, contracts pointed
to remains the same as it did in situation Y , and so T (Y^ ) = T (Y ) and t(Y^ ) = t(Y ).
Thus, C(Y^ ) = C(Y ), proving IRC.
To show that substitutability can be violated, consider the following example. Suppose
three divisions 1, 2, and 3 with preferences: wP1yP1;, xP2zP2;, and xP3wP3;. Suppose
that the priority structure is 1 Bx 3 Bx 2, 2 By 3 By 1, 2 Bz 3 Bz 1, and 1 Bw 2 Bw 3. For
this problem, with Y  fx; y; zg, we have that C(Y ) = fx; yg, but with Y^  Y [ fwg,
we have C(Y^ ) = fw; x; zg. The problem here is that the introduction of  a new contract
can make some division worse off, because the new contract can result in the loss of  access
to a contract that that division used to get through trading, as a consequence of  the partner
to that trade leaving earlier, and the inheritor of  the desired contract not being interested in
trading with the division in question.
As demonstrated in the counterexample, the problem with more ﬂexible conﬂict-resolution
together with the goal of  efﬁciency is that the resolution process might not be consistent in
the way it treats a division in terms of  its welfare. Even a three-way trading cycle can lead
to this non-harmonious welfare impact of  an extra contract opportunity, and possibly lead
to complementarity of  choice at the institutional level.
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1.4 Take-it-or-leave-it Bargaining
Towards an understanding of  the impact of  strategic behavior by talents and by insti-
tutional actors, consider a multi-stage game form G, where each talent makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer of  a set of  contracts to an institution in the ﬁrst stage, and institutions choose
contracts which to accept in the second stage, with the ﬁnal outcome being determined by
these institutional choices. I will focus on Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria (SPNE).
While it is certainly the case that the take-it-or-leave-it assumption places a great deal
of  the bargaining power in the hands of  the talents, it is also worth recognizing that this
bargaining power is mitigated by the presence of  talent competition in the ﬁrst stage, en-
hanced by the possibility of  making offers that have multiple acceptable contracts, and so
effective bargaining power of  any particular talent is endogenous. We shall see that the
set of  outcomes realizable in SPNE are pairwise stable when institutions have an inclusive
hierarchical governance structure.
It is possible that SPNE outcomes are unstable, though pairwise stable. The equilibria
of  such outcomes feature a coordination failure on the part of  talents and an institution, due
to the complementarities that are present even in bilaterally substitutable preferences of  a
division. With a strengthening of  conditions on institutional choice to include the Pareto
Separable condition, introduced by Hatﬁeld and Kojima (2010), I obtain the stronger result
of  stability of  SPNE outcomes. More generally, restrictions on division preferences that
ensure equivalence between pairwise stability and stability ensure that SPNE outcomes are
stable. This is the case when all divisions have substitutable preferences, even though the
derived institutional choice fails substitutability.
There exists a literature on non-revelation mechanisms and hiring games like the take-
it-or-leave-it game studied here. Alcalde (1996) studied the marriage problem using such
a game form, and showed that the set of  (pairwise) stable outcomes can be implemented
in undominated Nash Equilibria. Alcalde et al. (1998) study a hiring game in the Kelso-
Crawford setting with ﬁrms and workers where ﬁrms propose salaries for each worker in
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the ﬁrst stage, and workers choose which ﬁrm to work given the proposed salaries. In this
ﬁrm-offering take-it-or-leave-it game, they obtain implementability of  the stable set in Sub-
game Perfect Nash Equilibria. Under the assumption of  additive preferences, they show
that in the worker-offering version of  the hiring game, the worker optimal stable outcome is
implementable in SPNE. Alcalde and Romero-Medina (2000) show SPNE implementabil-
ity of  the set of  stable outcomes for the college admission model using the two-stage game
form with students proposing in the ﬁrst stage. In Sotomayor (2003) and Sotomayor (2004),
the author provides SPNE implementation results for the pairwise stable set of  the marriage
model and the many-to-many matching (without contracts) model. Finally, Haeringer and
Wooders (2011) study a sequential game form, where ﬁrms (which have capacity one) are
proposers and workers can accept or reject offers, with acceptance being ﬁnal, and show
that in all SPNE the outcome is the worker optimal stable outcome.21
The side that moves ﬁrst in the two-stage game has a material impact on the stability
of  the outcome of  the game. Stability is a group rationality concept, and tests for the pres-
ence of  groups of  agents that can be made better off  by a coordinated alternative action.
When talents propose, a deviation by a worker cannot be coordinated in the SPNE solution
concept, and so at most the talent and an institution (via a division) is involved in altering
the outcome. In games where colleges or ﬁrms propose (see Alcalde and Romero-Medina
(2000) and Alcalde et al. (1998), respectively), a deviation by a college or ﬁrm can involve a
group of  workers, since many “offers” can be change in a deviation. Thus, it is not surpris-
ing that SPNE outcomes of  a college- or ﬁrm-proposing bargaining game are stable without
any assumptions on preferences, but outcomes of  a student- or worker-proposing game are
only pairwise stable for this domain. Obtaining stability in this latter version requires a
strengthening of  assumptions to identify stability with pairwise stability.
The distinction between the college admissions model and the Kelso-Crawford model
is also important to understand the implementation results in the literature. In the latter
21They also show that if  workers make decisions simultaneously, then the set of  SPNE outcomes expands to
include all stable outcomes and possibly some unstable ones as well.
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model, the presence of  a salary component, or more abstractly of  multiple potential con-
tracts between a ﬁrm-worker pair, means that implementability should not be expected,
given that as ﬁrst movers the workers/talents can take advantage of  their proposing power
to “select out” less preferred stable outcomes. In my setting, given the weak assumptions on
preferences, stability under SPNE cannot be assured, though pairwise stability can. How-
ever, for the stronger condition of  Pareto Separable preferences, together with the Weak
Substitutes and IRC conditions, stability of  SPNE outcomes is assured, a novel result con-
sidering the weakened domain.
Throughout this section, assume that we have a hierarchical matching problem E 2 EH,
where divisions have preferences instead of  merely choice functions. Also, assume that all
divisions have bilaterally substitutable preferences. Suppose the game is one of  complete
information, so that the preferences of  talents, contract sets, preferences of  divisions, and
the institutional hierarchies are common knowledge amongst the talents and divisions. The
formal description of  the game G(E) is as follows. There are two stages, the Offer stage
(Stage 1) and the Internal Choice stage (Stage 2). The players are the set of  talents I and the
set of  divisions D  Sk2K D(k). In Stage 1, the Offer stage, every talent simultaneously
makes one offer to one institution i.e. the action !i taken by a talent i is an element of 
i 
X(i). Let h0 be the history of  the game at the end of  the Offer stage. Then, if !  (!i)i2I is
the action proﬁle at the Offer stage, h0  (!).
In Stage 2, divisions choose amongst the contract offers to their institutions. Deﬁne
!k  X(k) \
S
i2I !i to be the set of  offers made to institution k. For each k 2 K, label
divisions in D(k) according to the linear order Bk, so that dkm Bk dkn if  and only m < n,
where m;n 2 f1; : : : ; jD(k)jg and dkm; dkn 2 D(k). Deﬁne Gk(!) to be the internal choice
game amongst divisions D(k) of  institution k given offers ! 2 
  Qi2I 
i. This internal
choice game is a sequential game with jD(k)j rounds from 1 to jD(k)j, where the player
at round n is dkn 2 D(k) and takes action kn. Let hk1  h0 be the history at the start of
the internal choice game and let hkn be the history of  play at the start of  round n, where
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hkm 
 
hkm 1; 
k
m 1

. The action that a division takes is to choose a subset of  contracts from
the available set of  contracts at round n. Deﬁne k1(hk1)  !k and
kn+1(h
k
n+1) = 
k
n+1((h
k
n; 
k
n))  kn(hkn)n
0@ [
i02I(kn)
X(i0)
1A ;
where k1(hk1) is the set of  offers available to division dk1 in round 1 and kn(hkn) is the set of
offers available to division dkn in round n given the history of  play hkn. Thus, the action kn is
an element of 2kn(hkn), the action space for dkn. Finally, for any two distinct institutions k and
k0, I shall treat the internal choice games G(k) and G(k0) as independent of  each other.22
Given the list of  actions a, where
a 

(!i)i2I ;
 
kn
n=jD(k)j
n=1

k2K

;
the outcome of  the game G(E) is a set of  contracts A(a)  Sk2K Sn=jD(k)jn=1 kn. A strategy
for a division dkn 2 D(k), denoted kn, is a map from the set of  all possible histories at round
n in the second stage, Hkn  fhkng, to the feasible set of  actions kn(hkn)  X(k). Let kn be
the set of  all strategies for division dkn. A strategy for a talent i, denoted i, is a map fromQ
i
i to 
i. Let i be the set of  all strategies for talent i. Deﬁne the strategy space  by
  (i)i2I 
 
kn
n=jD(k)j
n=1

k2K
:
Every strategy proﬁle  2  induces a path of  play a(), which is a list of  actions of  each
talent and division, and an outcome A()  A(a()).
22To be completely strict, an extensive game formalization of  the second stage would require some speci-
ﬁcation of  how rounds of  an institution’s internal choice game relates to the rounds of  another’s, and might
therefore allow for the strategy of  a division in one institution to depend on the choice of  a division in another
institution. The assumption of  these internal choice games as being independent of  each other is tantamount
to analyzing a strict formalization with one division per round with a restriction of  the class of  strategies al-
lowed. However, given the focus on subgame perfection, this restriction will not have a material impact on the
equilibrium outcomes. An alternative formalization would be to model all institutional choice games occurring
simultaneously, but with each choice game being sequential.
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A strategy proﬁle  2  is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) if
• for every division dkn and every ~ 2 kn  f dkng, it is the case that A()RdA(~) at
every history hkn 2 Hkn .
• for every talent i and every ~ 2 i  f ig, it is the case that A()RiA(~).
Since every list of  talent offers induces a subgame for the divisions in each institution,
we will ﬁrst study the internal choice game induced by a particular list of  offers ! 2 
. The
internal choice game induced by a hierarchical governance structure gives each division
a unique weakly dominant strategy to choose at each realization of  history its preference
maximizing set of  offers, taking ! as a parameter. Once ! is endogenized by embedding the
internal choice game into the two-stage bargaining game, the unique weak dominance of
this strategy remains. Denote this dominant strategy by ^kn, where for any history hkn 2 Hkn ,
^kn(h
k
n) = max
Pdkn
kn(h
k
n):
Moreover, requiring subgame perfection eliminates the use of  any other strategy in equilib-
rium. Therefore, the divisions actions and the ﬁnal outcome of  the internal choice game Gk
corresponds with the internal allocation and institutional choice produced by the inclusion-
ary hierarchical procedure.
Lemma 1.2. In any SPNE of G, the strategy of  any division dkn is ^kn. For any SPNE , Gk(!)
yields the outcome Ck(!k), where ! 
Q
i2I 

i .
Proof. At any history h 2 Hkn , division dkn can determine its contracts in the outcome of  the
game by its choice from the available offers kn(h), no matter what subsequent actions are
taken by other players. Therefore, the unique best response of dkn at history h is to choose the
action of  that corresponds to picking its preference-maximizing bundle from kn(h), which
is exactly the prescribed action according to strategy ^kn.
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Since in SPNE every division takes the action of  choosing its most preferred bundle of
contracts, the outcome at this equilibrium coincides with the revelation mechanism induced
by the institutional governance structure qua mechanism  k given !, which is strategyproof,
and immediately yields the conclusion that the internal choice game Gk at ! reproduces
the derived institutional choice function Ck(!k;  k(!k; (Pd)d2D(k))), denoted Ck(!k) for
simplicity, where (Pd)d2D(k)) are the true preferences of  divisions in D(k).
The previous lemma justiﬁes the reduction of  the second stage in the subsequent propo-
sitions to a list of  choice functions Ck. The interpretation is that with the inclusionary hier-
archical governance, the internal game amongst divisions can be separated from the game
between talent and institutions as a whole, given the focus on SPNE.
The ﬁrst result will be to demonstrate pairwise stability of  the outcome in SPNE. Note
that the proof, and hence the result, does not require any assumption on preferences of
divisions (and would only require the assumption of  IRC on institutional choice if  this choice
is taken to be the primitive).
Proposition 1.5. Let  2  be an SPNE of  the bargaining game G and let a() be the associated
equilibrium actions and A() be associated equilibrium outcome. Then A() is pairwise stable.
Proof. We know from lemma 1.2 that in SPNE, the subgame at any talent strategy proﬁle !,
Gk(!) yields as the outcome the institutional choice functionCk derived from the inclusion-
ary hierarchical procedure. That is, for any (i)i2I 2
Q
ii, the outcome of  the subgame
at history h0 = (!) is exactly CK(h0) 
S
k2K C
k(!k). The game G is thereby reduced to
a simultaneous game amongst the talent.
Now, suppose that the SPNE outcomeA() is not pairwise stable. Then there exists i 2
I , k 2 K and z 2 X(i; k)nA() such that z 2 Ck(A()[fzg) and z 2 C i(A()[fzg).
Suppose talent i were to deviate from offering i to offering z. Then, since Ck satisﬁes IRC,
z 2 Ck(A() [ fzg) and i 62 Ck(A() [ fzg) implies z 2 Ck ((A() [ fzg)ni ),
and so z 2 A((~i;  i)), where ~i = z. But then i strictly prefers the outcome from playing
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~i to playing i , contradicting our assumption that  is SPNE. Thus, A() is pairwise
stable.
Subgame perfection is not strong enough to ensure stability of  outcomes because talents
can fail to “coordinate” with their proposed contracts, as described in the following example.
Example 1.2. Suppose there are two talents Ian i and John j and an institution Kon-
sulting Group k. Let x and x0 be two potential contracts between Ian and Konsulting,
and let y and y0 be two potential contracts between John and Konsulting. Imagine, per-
haps, that contracts x and y stipulate working on the East Coast and contracts x0 and y0
stipulate working on the West Coast. Suppose Ian prefers the West Coast contract to the
East Coast contract, as does John i.e. x0P ixP i; and y0PjyPj;. Also, suppose that Kon-
sulting Group is composed of  just one division d, which would like to hire at least one of
Ian or John in either geographical region, but does not want to hire both in different re-
gions: fx0; y0gPdfx; ygPdxPdyPdx0Pdy0Pd;. While other talents and institutions may be
present, they are not required to demonstrate the “coordination failure” amongst talents;
assume that no other talents are acceptable to Konsulting Group and that Ian and John are
unacceptable to every other institution k0 6= k. Suppose in the non-cooperative bargaining
game described above Ian offers only contract x and John offers only contract y, and sup-
pose the one division in Konsulting Group chooses according to its preference, which it has
a weakly dominant strategy to do. Then both x and y are chosen, and moreover are SPNE
strategies for each talent, since Ian cannot improve by offering x0 instead of  (or as well as) x,
given that John is offering only y, and vice versa. Notice also that the division’s preferences
satisfy bilateral substitutes, and that fx; yg is pairwise stable but not stable. The only sta-
ble outcome is fx0; y0g, which constitutes another SPNE outcome, supported for example
by Ian offering x and John offering y. Both Ian and John prefer the equilibrium outcome
fx0; y0g to fx; yg, but cannot unilaterally prevent the less-preferred outcome. In fact, even
the division prefers fx0; y0g to fx; yg, and so SPNE outcomes can be inefﬁcient.
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When viewing institutional choice as primitive, stability of  SPNE outcomes can be re-
covered by strengthening the assumptions on these choice functions. Suppose that every
institution has a choice function satisfying IRC, bilateral substitutes and the Pareto Separa-
ble condition. Now, SPNE outcomes are stable and not just pairwise stable.
The power of  the Pareto Separable condition comes from the property that the set of
contracts between an institution and a talent now has a structure that is independent of  the
set of  contracts with other talents available to the institution. A pair of  contracts on which the
institution and the talent have opposing choice behavior in some choice situation will never
be harmonized in some other choice situation. This property is satisﬁed by substitutable
choice, but is not a characteristic of  it, since bilaterally substitutable choice functions that
are not substitutable can still be Pareto Separable.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose institutional choice functions are Pareto Separable and satisfy IRC and weak
substitutes. Then every SPNE outcome is stable.
The proof  of  the proposition lies in the recognition that under the assumption of  bilat-
eral substitutes and Pareto Separability, every group block can be reduced to an appropriate
pairwise block, and thus every pairwise stable outcome is also stable. In fact, we can weaken
the assumption from bilateral substitutability to weak substitutability, because these two sub-
stitutes conditions are equivalent given the Pareto Separable condition, stated in Proposition
1.1.
The equivalence of  stability concepts under the Pareto Separable condition is the key
lemma to the proof  of  stability of  SPNE outcomes, and can be understood by recognizing
that a block of  an outcome that involves a contract between an institution and talent who
have a contract with each other in the blocked allocation, a renegotiation, can be reduced to
a block by just this contract. Similarly, any group block that does not have a renegotiation
cannot involve more than one contract, if  bilateral substitutability is to remain inviolate. But
then any block can be reduced to a singleton block, and so stability is equivalent to pairwise
stability.
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Lemma 1.3. Suppose institutional choice functions are Pareto Separable and satisfy IRC and weak
substitutes. Then the set of  stable outcome coincides with the set of  pairwise stable outcomes.
Proof. It is clear that every stable outcome is pairwise stable, by deﬁnition. To prove the
converse, suppose A is pairwise stable. Assume that A is not stable. Then there exists an
institution k and Z  X(k)nA(k) such that Z  Ck(A [ Z) and Z(i)P iA(i) for every
i 2 I(Z), and such that no Z 0 ( Z has this same blocking property as Z. We say that such
a Z is a minimal blocking group. We will show that jZj = 1, contradicting the assumption
that A is not pairwise blocked.
First, suppose that there exists z 2 Z such that the talent I(z) has a contract with k
in A i.e. I(z) 2 I(A(k)). Let y 2 A(k) be the contract between I(z) and k in A that is
renegotiated via the block Z. Since z 2 Ck(A(k) [ Z) and y 2 A(k), from the Pareto
Separable condition we have that y 62 Ck(A(k)[fzg). Now, suppose z 62 Ck(A(k)[fzg).
Then, by IRC we know that Ck(A(k) [ fzg) = Ck(A(k)) 3 y, a contradiction. Thus,
z 2 Ck(A(k) [ fzg), which implies that fzg blocks A. Given that Z is a minimal blocking
set, this implies Z = fzg and so A is not pairwise stable, a contradiction.
Second, suppose that for every z 2 Z, talent I(z) does not have a contract with k
in A i.e. I(z) 62 I(A(k)). Suppose that there exist z; x 2 Z where z 6= x. Clearly,
I(z) 6= I(x) given IRC and the assumption that a talent-institution pair can sign at most
one contract in an allocation. Deﬁne Y = A(k) [ (Znfz; xg). Since Z is a minimal
block, z 62 Ck(Y [ fzg) = Ck(A(k)) where the equality follows from IRC. However, z 2
Ck(Y [fz; xg) = Ck(A(k)[Z) by deﬁnition of  a block. However, given that I(z); I(x) 62
I(A(k)) and since jA(k)j = jI(A(k)j, this block would violate assumption that Ck satisﬁes
weak substitutes. Thus, Z must contain no more than one contract and so A is not pairwise
stable, a contradiction.
Thus, we have proved that every pairwise stable outcome is stable.
Hence our proof  of  Proposition 1.6 is an immediate application of  our previous results.
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Proof. From Proposition 1.5 we have that every SPNE outcome is pairwise stable. From
Lemma 1.3 we have that every pairwise stable outcome is stable.
Another result is that the SPNE outcomes of  the bargaining game are stable under the
assumption that all divisions have substitutable preferences. Given the discussion of  the pre-
vious section that substitutability of  preferences of  divisions does not ensure substitutability
or even unilateral substitutability of  institutional choice, this result proves stability of  the non-
cooperative bargaining game outcomes for this class of  bilaterally substitutable institutional
choice functions. Note that the following proposition does not following from Proposition
1.6, because the property of  Pareto Separability need not be preserved by inclusionary hi-
erarchical procedures.
Proposition 1.7. Suppose that every division has substitutable preferences. Then every SPNE outcome
of  the game G is stable.
The proof  of  the proposition follows immediately given the following lemma.
Lemma 1.4. Suppose every division has substitutable preferences. Then every pairwise stable outcome is
stable.
Proof. Let A  X be a pairwise stable outcome. Suppose that there exists a blocking set
Z  XnA involving institution k, so that Z  Ck(A(k) [ Z) and zPI(z)A(I(z)) for
every z 2 Z. Under the inclusionary hierarchical procedure, every contract in Z is al-
located divisions in D(k). Denote by f the internally stable allocation given choice situa-
tion A(k) and by g the internally stable allocation given the choice situation A(k) [ Z i.e.
f   k  A(k); (Pd)d2D(k) and g   k  A(k) [ Z; (Pd)d2D(k). Let d^ be highest-ranked
division to obtain one or more contracts from Z, deﬁne as follows: Z \ g(d^) 6= ; and for
every dBk d^, Z \ g(d) = ;. We will show that there exists some contract z^ 2 Z such that
z^ constitutes a pairwise block of A, contradicting the opening assumption.
Let z^ 2 Z 0  Z \ g(d^) 6= ;. By deﬁnition no division d Bk d^ is allocated a contract
in Z in choice situation A(k) [ Z. Also, none of  the talents with contracts in Z have alter-
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native contracts in A that are allocated under g to any division higher-ranked than d^, since
feasibility of  the internal allocation would then prevent any such talent’s contract in Z being
chosen by the institution. We know that for every division dBk d^ g(d) = f(d) by IRC of  di-
vision choice, trivially satisﬁed since divisions have preferences. In fact, IRC yields another
conclusion, that g0(d) = f(d) for every d Bk d^, where g   k  A(k) [ fz^g; (Pd)d2D(k).
Consider also that when the inclusionary hierarchical procedure determines the allocation
from A(k) [ Z for d^, every contract that is available at this stage when the choice situation
for the institution is A(k), call it A0, is still available for d^ in the expanded choice situation
A(k) [ Z. By IRC of  division’s choice, we know that removing contracts in Z that are not
in Z 0 has no effect on choice of d^. By substitutability of  division’s choice, we know that
z^ 2 C d^(A0 [Z 0) implies z^ 2 C d^(A0 [ fz^g). But then z^ 2 Ck(A(k)[ fz^g), and so z^ blocks
A, which contradicts the assumption of  pairwise stability of A, and concludes the proof.
An implementation result analogous to some in the literature, however, is not forthcom-
ing, as the following example shows. The difﬁculty with achieving implementation in SPNE
in a setting with multiple potential contracts between the two sides and with talents offering
ﬁrst is that there is very little competition over institutions, since talents do not make offers
to more than one institution. This gives a lot of  bargaining power to the talents, and makes
it so that any bilateral “surplus” consistent with stability goes to the ﬁrst mover, the talents.
Example 1.3. Suppose there is one institution k trivially consisting of  one division d and
three talents ix; iy; iz, where the choice function of  the division is given as follows:
Y ! C(Y ) Y ! C(Y ) Y ! C(Y )
fxg ! fxg fx; yg ! fx; yg fx; y0g ! fx; y0g
fyg ! fyg fx; zg ! fx; zg fy; y0g ! fy0g
fzg ! fzg fy; zg ! fy; zg fy0; zg ! fy0; zg
fy0g ! fy0g
fx; y; zg ! fx; y; zg fx; y0; zg ! fx; y0g fx; y; y0; zg ! fx; y; zg
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with contract x belonging to ix, contracts y and y0 to iy, and contract z to iz.
Suppose preferences of  the three agents are: xP ix;, yP iyy0P iy; and zP iz;. The choice
function satisﬁes BLS and IRC, and is (for example) consistent with the following prefer-
ences:
fx; y; zgPdfx; y0gPdfy0; zgPdfx; ygPdfy; zgPdfx; zgPdfy0gPdfygPdfxgPdfzgPd;
for the division.
There is only one stable allocation A1  fx; y; zg, which is also pairwise stable. How-
ever, A2  fx; y0g is also pairwise stable, though unstable.
Note that A2 cannot be supported as a SPNE of  the game G, because ty could strictly
improve by offering y instead of y0, keeping ﬁxed the offers of  other talents, which must be
x by tx and could be either z or ;. If tz is offering z, then if ty offers y the division picks
fx; y; zg. If tz is offering ;, then the division picks fx; yg. Thus, A2 cannot be an SPNE
outcome.
1.5 Conclusion
Stability has proven to be an important requirement that market outcomes should satisfy
if  the market is to function well. Using a matching-theoretic model, in this paper I show how
hierarchies as a governance mode in institutions might persist in the market as a result of
choice behavior that ensures stable market outcomes, a property that is not shared by some
other organizational modes within institutions.
The novel approach complements existing theories for the presence of  hierarchies in in-
stitutions in a market setting. Hierarchies induce institutionally efﬁcient and strategyproof
internal assignment rules while also producing market-level choice behavior that ensures
stability. An important departure taken in this paper from the standard matching with con-
tracts framework is that institutions are groups of  decision-makers enjoined by a governance
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structure, which is modeled as an internal assignment rule. The decentralized market, stud-
ied as a noncooperative take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game, supports the conclusion that
market outcomes will be pairwise stable generally, and stable under the assumption of  sub-
stitutable preferences for divisions.
While the focus of  this paper is on hierarchical governance within institutions, other
governance structures could be considered, especially ones that allow for multiple internally
stable assignments. Broadly speaking, the institutions could be thought of  as competing allo-
cation systems, with talents selecting into a particular institution. The framework allows for
the study of  buyer-seller relationships with institutional rules that may vary by jurisdiction.
An axiomatic approach to this problem is a topic of  ongoing research.
1.6 Proofs
Deﬁnition 1.8. Given a combinatorial choice function C with domain X , deﬁne the Blair relation %R
as follows: for any A  X , B  X , A %R B if A = C(A [ B). Let R be the asymmetric
component of %R.
The proofs of  the main results (Theorems 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and Proposition 1.2) are obtained
by a simple induction argument, given the results below.
For the following proofs, let C1 and C2 be choice functions deﬁned on some domain X ,
where I(x) is the talent associated with contract x 2 X . Let C1  C2 denote the choice
function derived from the inclusionary hierarchical procedure, where division 1 ranks higher
than division 2.
Proposition 1.8. Suppose C1 and C2 satisfy IRC. Then C  C1 C2 satisﬁes IRC.
Proof. Let Y  X and x 62 Y such that x 62 C(Y^ ), where Y^  Y [ fxg. Then x 2 C1(Y^ )
and so C1(Y^ ) = C1(Y ), since C1 satisﬁes IRC. If I(x) 2 I(C1(Y )), then x 62 ~R1(Y^ )
implying ~R1(Y^ ) = ~R1(Y ) and so C2( ~R1(Y^ )) = C2( ~R1(Y )). Thus, C(Y^ ) = C1(Y^ ) [
C2( ~R1(Y^ )) = C1(Y ) [ C2( ~R1(Y )) = C(Y ), so IRC is satisﬁed in this case.
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Instead, if I(x) 62 I(C1(Y )), then x 2 ~R1(Y^ ). Now, since x 62 C(Y^ ), it must be
that x 2 C2( ~R1(Y^ )) and since ~R1(Y^ ) = ~R1(Y ) [ fxg, IRC of C2 implies C2( ~R1(Y^ )) =
C2( ~R1(Y ) [ fxg) = C2( ~R1(Y )), implying C(Y^ ) = C(Y ) and establishing that C satisﬁes
IRC.
Proposition 1.9. Suppose C1 and C2 satisfy SARP. Then C  C1 C2 satisﬁes SARP.
Proof. Assume that C violates SARP, in order to obtain a contradiction. Given that SARP
implies IRC, we know that C1 and C2 satisfy IRC. Then from Proposition 1.8 we know that
C satisﬁes IRC. Finally, from Alva (2012) we know that if C satisﬁes IRC it satisﬁes WARP.
So, if C violates SARP but not WARP, there exists a sequence X1; : : : ; Xn; Xn+1 = X1,
with n  3, such that Ym+1 %R Ym for all m 2 f1; : : : ; ng and Yl+1 R Yl for at least
one l, where Ym  C(Xm) and %R is the previously deﬁned Blair relation associated with
C. To see the connection between the condition in the deﬁnition of SARP and the Blair
relation, notice that the cycle condition for SARP requires Ym  Xm+1. Now, by IRC we
get Ym+1 = C(Xm+1) = C(Ym+1 [ Ym), which means that Ym+1 %R Ym.
Next, deﬁne am  C1(Xm) = C1(Ym), where the latter equality follows from IRC,
deﬁne bm  C2( ~R1(Xm)), where ~R1(Xm)  fx 2 Xm : I(x) 62 I(C1(Xm))g. Notice that
bm = Ymnam and that am\ bm = ;. Also, for any Z  X , am %R1 Z, where%R1 is the Blair
relation generated by C1. Since am  Xm and am  Xm+1, and am+1  Xm+1, we have
that am+1 R1 am or am+1 = am. However, given that C1 satisﬁes SARP, we cannot have
am+1 %R1 am for all m and al+1 R1 al for some l. Thus, for any m, am = am+1.
Now, deﬁne Zm  ~R1(Xm). Notice that bm  Zm. Moreover, since am = am+1 and
bm \ am = ;, we have that bm \ am+1 = ; and so bm  Zm+1. However, this means
bm+1 %R2 bm, where %R2 is the Blair relation generated by C2. Given that C2 satisﬁes SARP,
an analogous argument to the one in the previous paragraph, given for C1, applies here
and allows us to conclude that bm = bm+1 for any m. But then Ym = Ym+1 for all m,
contradicting our assumption of  a choice cycle. Thus, C  C1 C2 satisﬁes SARP.
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Proposition 1.10. Suppose C1 and C2 satisfy IRC and WeakSubs. Then C  C1 C2 satisﬁes
IRC and WeakSubs.
Proof. We have already proved that C satisﬁes IRC under the given assumptions.
Let Y  X such that jI(Y )j = jY j. Let x 2 XnY and I(x) 62 I(Y ) and z 2 XnY ,
z 6= x, I(z) 62 I(Y [fxg). Suppose z 62 C(Y [fzg). If x 62 C(Y^ ), where Y^  Y [fz; xg,
then by IRC of C1 and C2, and hence of C, we have that C(Y^ ) = C(Y [ fzg) implying
z 62 C(Y^ ). Instead, suppose x 2 C(Y^ ). Now, z 62 C(Y [ fzg) implies z 62 C1(Y [ fzg).
By IRC of C1, x 62 C1(Y^ ) implies z 62 C1(Y^ ), so, given I(z) 62 I(Y [ fzg), z 2 ~R1(Y^ ).
If x 2 C1(Y^ ), then x 62 ~R1(Y^ ). Moreover, by WeakSubs of C1, for any y 62 C1(Y [ fzg),
y 62 C1(Y^ ). Thus, given that there is no more than one contract per talent in the available
sets, if y 2 ~R1(Y [ fzg), then y 2 ~R1(Y^ ). Thus, by WeakSubs and IRC of C2, given
that z 62 C2( ~R1(Y [ fzg)), it must be that z 62 C2( ~R1(Y^ )). Finally, if x 62 C1(Y^ ), then
~R1(Y^ ) = ~R1(Y [fzg)[fxg and so again IRC and WeakSubs ofC2 implies z 62 C2( ~R1(Y^ )).
Thus, C satisﬁes WeakSubs.
Proposition 1.11. Suppose C1 and C2 satisfy IRC and BLS. Then C  C1  C2 satisﬁes IRC
and BLS.
Proof. We have already proved that C satisﬁes IRC under the given assumptions.
Let Y  X , x; z 2 XnY , I(x) 6= I(z), I(x); I(z) 62 I(Y ). Suppose z 62 C(Y [ fzg).
Deﬁne Y^  Y [ fz; xg.
In the ﬁrst case, suppose x 62 C(Y^ ). Then x 62 C1(Y^ ). Since I(x) 62 I(Y [ fxg),
x 2 ~R1(Y^ ). By IRC of C1, z 62 C1(Y^ ) and I(z) 62 I(Y [ fzg) implies z 2 ~R1(Y^ ). Thus,
~R1(Y^ ) = ~Rz(Y [fzg)[fxg = ~R1(Y )[fz; xg. Now, we know that z 62 C2( ~R1(Y [fzg))
and so by BLS of C2, z 62 C2( ~R1(Y^ )). Thus, z 62 C1(Y^ ) [ C2( ~R1(Y^ )) = C(Y^ ), proving
that C satisﬁes the BLS condition for this case.
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In the second case, suppose x 2 C(Y^ ). In the ﬁrst subcase, suppose x 2 C1(Y^ ). By
BLS of C1, z 62 C1(Y^ ). Since I(z) 62 I(Y [ fxg), z 2 ~R1(Y^ ). Moreover, by BLS of
C1, if y 2 ~R1(Y [ fzg) and I(y) 62 C1(Y [ fzg) then y 2 ~R1(Y^ ), keeping in mind that
I(y) 6= I(x). Thus, ~R1(Y^ )  ~R1(Y [ fzg) and I(z) has only one contract in ~R1(Y^ ).
Now if  for all y 2 ~R1(Y^ )n ~R1(Y [ fzg), we have that y 62 C2( ~R1(Y^ )), then IRC implies
z 62 C2( ~R1(Y^ )). Instead, if y 2 C2( ~R1(Y^ )) then by IRC we have y 2 C2( ~Y [ fyg),
where ~Y  ~R1(Y^ )nfw 2 ~R1(Y^ ) : I(w) = I(y)g. But now, since I(y) 6= I( ~Y ) and since
j ~Y (I(z))j = 1, BLS of C2 implies that z 62 C2( ~Y [ fyg) and so by IRC z 62 C2( ~R1(Y^ )).
Thus, z 62 C(Y^ ).
In the second subcase of  the second case, suppose x 62 C1(Y^ ). Since x 2 C(Y^ ), it must
be that x 2 C2( ~R1(Y^ )). By IRC of C1, we have that ~R1(Y^ ) = ~R1(Y [ fzg) [ fxg =
~R1(Y ) [ fz; xg. By BLS of C2, we have z 62 C2( ~R1(Y ) [ fzg), implying z 62 C2( ~R(Y ) [
fz; xg) = C2( ~R1(Y^ )) and so z 62 C(Y^ ).
Having established that z 62 C(Y^ ) in every case, we have that C satisﬁes BLS.
1.7 Appendix: The Comparative Statics of  Combina-
torial Choice
Fix a choice function. For any set of  contracts Y , letR(Y ) be the set of  contracts rejected
from Y and C(Y ) the set of  contracts chosen from Y , and let I(Y ) be the set of  talents with
contracts in Y . Let A be the current set of  contracts available, and let a be a contract not
in A. Deﬁne A^  A [ fag.
• The condition NewOfferChosen (NOC) is satisﬁed if  and only if  the following is true:
a 2 C(A^).
• The condition NewOfferFromNewTalent (NOFNT) is satisﬁed if  and only if  the following
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is true: I(a) 62 I(A).
• The condition NewOfferFromHeldTalent (NOFHT) is satisﬁed if  and only if  the following
is true: I(a) 2 I(C(A)).
• The condition NewOfferFromRejectedTalent (NOFRT) is satisﬁed if  and only if  the follow-
ing is true: I(a) 62 I(C(A)).
• The condition RenegotiateWithHeldTalent (RWHT) is satisﬁed if  and only if  the following
is true:

9x 2 R(A); x 2 C(A^) ^ I(x) 2 I(C(A))

.
• The setRRT is the set of  talents rejected at A but recalled at A^, excepting the talent
making the new offer i.e. RRT  (I(A)nI(C(A))) \ I(C(A^)).
• The condition RecallRejectedTalent (RRT) is satisﬁed if  and only if  the following is true:
9x 2 R(A); x 2 C(A^) ^ I(x) 62 I(C(A))

. Equivalently, RRT is satisﬁed if  and
only if RRT 6= ;.
• The set RHT is the set of  talents held at A but rejected at A^, excepting the talent
making the new offer i.e. RHT  I(C(A)) \

I(A)nI(C(A^))

.
• The condition RejectHeldTalent (RHT) is satisﬁed if  and only if  the following is true:
9i 2 I(C(A)); i 62 I(C(A^))

. Equivalently, RHT is satisﬁed if  and only ifRHT 6=
;.
• The condition UnitarySet (UnitS) is satisﬁed if  and only the following is true: jI(A)j =
jAj.
Let A be a subset of  contracts and a 62 A, with A^  A [ fag.
1. A choice function fails IRC if :NewOfferChosen and (RejectHeldTalent or RecallRejected-
Talent or RenegotiateWithHeldTalent).
2. A choice function fails ParSep if RenegotiateWithHeldTalent.
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3. A choice function fails ULS if RecallRejectedTalent.
4. A choice function fails BLS if NewOfferFromNewTalent and RecallRejectedTalent.
5. A choice function satisﬁes Subs if  and only if  it is never the case that RenegotiateWith-
HeldTalent or RecallRejectedTalent is true.
6. A choice function fails WS if  (IRC or UnitarySet) and NewOfferFromNewTalent and NewOf-
ferChosen and :RenegotiateWithHeldTalent and RecallRejectedTalent.
For a summary of  these comparative statics results, see Table 1.1.
New Offer Chosen: a 2 C(A [ fag)
New Offer From
N e w T a l e n t :
I(a) 62 I(A)
Recall Rejected Talent :Recall Rejected Talent
Renegotiate With
Held Talent
Fails ParSep
Fails ULS
Fails BLS
Fails ParSep
:Renegotiate With
Held Talent
Fails ULS
Fails BLS
IRC or UnitS =) Fails WS
New Offer From
H e l d T a l e n t :
I(a) 2 I(C(A))
Recall Rejected Talent :Recall Rejected Talent
Renegotiate With
Held Talent
Fails ParSep
Fails ULS Fails ParSep
:Renegotiate With
Held Talent
Fails ULS
New Offer From
R e j e c t e d Ta l -
ent: I(a) 2
I(A)nI(C(A))
Recall Rejected Talent :Recall Rejected Talent
Renegotiate With
Held Talent
Fails ParSep
Fails ULS
IRC =) Fails BLS
Fails ParSep
:Renegotiate With
Held Talent
Fails ULS
IRC =) Fails BLS
IRC =) Fails WS
Table 1.1: Categorizing Choice Behavior where A is initially available and a 62 A is a new
contract offer
1.8 Appendix: Concepts of  Stability
An allocation A 2 A is pairwise stable (or contractwise stable) if  it is individually
stable and there does not exist a contract x 2 XnA such that x 2 CK(x)(A [ fxg) and
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x 2 CI(x)(A [ fxg).
An allocation A 2 A is renegotiation-proof if  it is individually stable and there does
not exist k 2 K and Y  X(I(A(k)); k)nA such that Y  Ck(A [ Y ) and Y (j) 2
Cj(A [ Y ) for every j 2 I(Y ). This notion of  stability rules out allocations where an
institution and some subset of  agents with which it holds contracts have alternate contracts
amongst themselves that they would all choose over their current contracts if  available. Thus,
renegotiation-proof  allocations are intra-coalitionally efﬁcient.
An allocationA 2 A is strongly pairwise stable if  it is individually stable, renegotiation-
proof, and there does not exist an agent-institution pair (i; k) 2 I  K that have no con-
tract with each other in A i.e. A \ X(i; k) = ;, a contract x 2 X(i; k, and a collection
of  contracts Y  X(I(A(k)); k)nA(k) such that Y [ fxg  CK(x)(A [ Y [ fxg) and
x 2 CI(x)(A [ fxg) and Y (j) 2 Cj(A [ Y ) for every j 2 I(Y ). This notion of  stability
rules out blocks coming from an institution and agent without an existing relationship where
the institution can renegotiate with some agents with which it has an existing relationship.
It is an enjoining of  the renegotiation-proof  concept and of  the pairwise stable concept.
Note that the strongly pairwise stable outcomes need not be stable, because a blocking
set of  contracts in the latter concept can include more than one agent that does not have a
held contract with the blocking institution (where w.l.o.g. there is one blocking institution).
However, if  all divisions have choice functions that satisfy BLS and IRC, then every strongly
pairwise stable outcome is also stable.
Proposition 1.12. If  choice functions satisfy BLS and IRC, then the strongly pairwise stable set is
equivalent to the stable set.
Proof. Every stable outcome is strongly pairwise stable, so we shall prove the converse, and do
so by contradiction. SupposeA is strongly pairwise stable but not stable. Since it is not stable,
there exists an institution k, a subset of  talents J  I , and a collection of  contractsZ  XnA
where every contract in Z involves k and some talent in J and no two distinct contracts in
Z name the same talent, such that for every j 2 J , Z(j)PjA(j) and Z  Ck(A[Z). This
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set of  contracts Z blocks A. Without loss of  generality, let us suppose that Z is a minimal
blocking set i.e. there does not exist Z 0  Z such that Z 0  Ck(A [ Z 0). Given that A is
strongly pairwise stable, we also know that there exists at least two talents i1; i2 2 J who
do not have contracts in A with institution k. Let z1  Z(i1) and z2  Z(i2), and deﬁne
Y  Znfz1; z2g. Since Z is a minimal blocking set, we know that Y \Ck(A[ Y ) = ; and
(Y [fz1g)\Ck(A[Y [fz1g) = ;, so z1 62 Ck(A[Y [ z1). But since Z  Ck(A[Z), it
must be that z1 2 Ck(A [ Z). However, implies that Ck violates bilateral substitutes, since
z1 and z2 are contracts with distinct talents who do not have any contracts with k in A[ Y ,
which is a contradiction.
This result is the counterpart to the well-known result on pairwise stability and stability
under the assumption of  substitutability, stated here for completeness.
Result 1.1. In the classical matching model, the set of  pairwise and strongly pairwise stable allocations is
identical. Moreover, if  choice functions satisfy substitutability and IRC, then the set of  stable matchings and
the set of  pairwise stable matchings coincide, and these sets coincide with the strongly pairwise stable set and
the renegotiation-proof  set.
The following propositions document that the strong pairwise stability concept in the
domain of  BLS and IRC divisional choice functions is distinct from the weaker concepts of
pairwise stability and renegotiation-proofness.
Proposition 1.13. If  choice functions satisfy BLS and IRC, then the pairwise stable set is distinct from
the renegotiation-proof  set, which is distinct from the strongly pairwise stable set.
Proof. Consider the following example with one institution and three agents, where the
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choice function of  the institution is given as follows:
Y ! C(Y ) Y ! C(Y ) Y ! C(Y )
x! x xy ! xy xy0 ! xy0
y ! y xz ! xz yy0 ! y0
z ! z yz ! yz y0z ! y0z
y0 ! y0
xyz ! xyz xy0z ! xy0 xyy0z ! xyz
Suppose preferences of  the three agents are: xPx;, yPyy0Py; and zPz;. The choice function
satisﬁes BLS and IRC, and is (for example) consistent with the following preferences:
xyz  xy0  y0z  xy  yz  xz  y0  y  x  z  ;
for the institution. The set of  stable allocations is
ffx; y; zgg;
the set of  strongly pairwise stable allocations is
ffx; y; zgg;
the set of  renegotiation-proof  allocations is the set of  all individually stable allocations, and
the set of  pairwise stable allocations is
ffx; y; zg; fx; y0gg:
Finally, I show by example that under a notion of  substitutability weaker than BLS,
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the notion of  Weak Substitutes introduced in Hatﬁeld and Kojima (2008), the equivalence
between strong pairwise stability and stability is broken.
Proposition 1.14. If  choice functions satisfy WeakSubs and IRC, then the strongly pairwise stable set
is distinct from the stable set.
Proof. Consider the following example with one institution and three agents, where the
choice function of  the institution is given as follows:
Y ! C(Y ) Y ! C(Y ) Y ! C(Y )
x! x xy ! xy xy0 ! y0
y ! y xz ! xz yy0 ! y0
z ! z yz ! yz y0z ! y0
y0 ! y0
xyz ! xyz xy0z ! y0 xyy0z ! xyz
Suppose preferences of  the three agents are: xPx;, yPyy0Py; and zPz;. The choice function
satisﬁes Weak Subs and IRC, though it fails BLS, and is (for example) consistent with the
following preferences:
xyz  y0  xy  yz  xz  y  x  z  ;
for the institution. The set of  stable allocations is
ffx; y; zgg;
the set of  strongly pairwise stable allocations is
ffx; y; zg; fy0gg;
the set of  renegotiation-proof  allocations is the set of  all individually stable allocations, and
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the set of  pairwise stable allocations is
ffx; y; zg; fy0gg:
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Chapter 2
Pairwise Stability and Asymmetric
Complementarity
2.1 Introduction
Matching theory has had great success in both the study of  decentralized labor mar-
kets and in the design of  real-world mechanisms for both centralized labor markets and
indivisible goods allocation. Case studies of  actual centralized mechanisms, evidence from
laboratory experiments, and theoretical work has lent support for stability-type concepts,
particularly pairwise stability, as the appropriate solution for matching models. The stronger
notion of  group-stability has also been studied, and has the appeal of  being equivalent to
the core concept in many-to-one matching models.
However, group stable outcomes are not guaranteed to exist in matching problems where
at least one side can have multiple partners. In the setting of  classical many-to-one matching,
where the terms of  the match between a pair of  agents is of  a ﬁxed type, substitutability is the
weakest preference requirement that ensures the existence of  group stable matchings over a
Cartesian domain of  preferences. With this domain restriction, not only is existence assured,
but also the set of  group stable outcomes has a lattice structure, and in particular, for each
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side there is an outcome that is best amongst all group-stable outcomes. This restriction on
the domain of  preferences has another important consequence – the group-stable outcomes
are the same as the pairwise-stable outcomes, and so the concept of  group-stability has no
reﬁning power on the more basic concept of  pairwise-stability. Therefore, pairwise stability,
introduced together with the original matching framework by the ground-breaking paper
Gale and Shapley (1962), is the key stability notion that uniﬁes a large variety of  matching
models.1
The study of  the stable set in markets with complementarities requires either restrictions
on the preferences or the family of  allowable relationships, both of  which have been explored
in recent work. I take a different approach by using the observation that every existence
result for the stable set is for domains where the stable set coincides with the pairwise stable
set. I argue that pairwise stability is a well-motivated solution concept, and I study the
existence of  pairwise stable matchings in problems where group stable matchings are not
guaranteed to exist, focusing on particular classes of  complementarity. An important ﬁnding
is that the problem of  existence of  pairwise stable (and hence stable) matchings is connected
to a type of  complementarity that I term subjectively asymmetric complements (SAC). The presence
of  such complementarity in the choice of  some ﬁrm implies that there can be otherwise
regular markets where no pairwise stable matching exists. In a positive result, I show that if
no ﬁrm exhibits SAC, then a pairwise stable matching is guaranteed to exist. Existence is
demonstrated by use of  a sequential-offer worker-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm.
Kelso and Crawford (1982) signiﬁcantly generalized the early matching models by con-
sidering a many-to-one model with salaries (contracts) and with a weaker assumption on
preferences, the gross substitutes condition, and using a stronger notion of  stability, group
stability, which they argue is the preferred notion because it is equivalent here to the core.
However, it is well known that in a general many-to-one matching model (where preferences
1In their marriage model, these authors show that pairwise stable allocations exist for any proﬁle of  strict
preferences of  both sides of  the market. This is also true for their college admissions model, a model of  many-
to-one matching, where preferences are assumed to be responsive with quotas.
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are unrestricted), a pairwise stable allocation may not exist (and the core is therefore empty).
Echenique and Oviedo (2004) studies the Core of  general many-to-one matching mar-
kets, and characterizes the Core as the set of  ﬁxed points of  an operator. See also Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) for an argument why pairwise stable matchings is the relevant solution
concept in certain settings, particularly decentralized ones.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 The Elements
Let F be the set of  ﬁrms andW be the set of  workers, these sets being mutually exclusive.
For any agent i 2 F[W , the setPi is the set of  possible partners of  agent i; the two-sidedness
of  this market is captured by the requirement that Pf  W for any f 2 F and Pw  F
for any w 2 W . Workers can only work for at most one ﬁrm, but ﬁrms can hire teams of
workers, or none at all. A matching is a correspondence  from F [W to F [W satisfying:
1. For all f 2 F , (f)  Pf ,
2. For all w 2 W , (w)  Pw and j(w)j  1.
Each worker w has strict preferences over his partners and over being unmatched, em-
bodied by a complete, transitive, asymmetric binary relation w on the set fA  2Pf :
jAj  1g, and is assumed to choose from any set of  available ﬁrms by selecting the maxi-
mum from the set according to this preference relation; this choice function is denoted Cw.
This asymmetric relation has an antisymmetric counterpart%w, where, for anyA;B  Pw,
A %w B if  and only A w B or A = B.
Each ﬁrm f is assumed to have a choice process, the outcome of  which is captured by a
choice function Cf : 2Pf ! 2Pf , which necessarily satisﬁes, for any A 2 2Pf , C(A)  A.
For example, the ﬁrm f might have strict preferences over the collection of  subsets of  its
partner set Pf , the maximization of  which yields a chosen set from a given choice set.
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2.2.2 Stability Concepts
A matching describes the active partnerships in the economy. However, some match-
ings have agents who have an incentive to dissolve one or more partnerships. For a worker,
for example, being matched to a ﬁrm that is less preferred than having no partner violates
individual rationality, because the worker could be better off  by himself. Formally, a match-
ing  is Individually Rational (IR) if  for all workersw 2 W if (w) %w ;, i.e. there is no worker
w that individually blocks the matching . A ﬁrm, too, could have the incentive to dissolve a
partnership. Given the underlying assumption that workers are independent actors, a ﬁrm
can dissolve a relationship with one matched worker while maintaining its relationship with
some other matched worker. This would be ﬁrm f ’s course of  action at some matching 
if Cf ((f)) 6= (f), which captures the idea that given the choice, the ﬁrm would choose
a strict subset of  its current set of  partners; this is an individual block by the ﬁrm. A matching
is Individually Stable (IS) if  for every ﬁrm f , C((f)) = (f) and if  it is IR i.e. there is no
individual block by any agent.
Individual Stability captures the actions individual agents could unilaterally take to bet-
ter themselves. However, a ﬁrm and a worker could also desire to create a partnership
between each other, thereby upsetting a matching. Formally, a ﬁrm-worker pair (f; w) 2
F W is creates a block if ffg w (w) and w 2 Cf ((f) [ fwg) i.e. ﬁrm f and worker
w are a block of  matching  if  worker w prefers f to its current match and is included in
ﬁrm f ’s choice from the set consisting of  its current partners together with w. A matching
is Stable if  it is IS and there is no block.
Another blocking concept that is relevant for our matching model is the group blocking
notion used in connection with the core solution concept. Formally, a group of  agents J 
F [W forms a corewise block of  a matching  via a matching 0 6=  if  1) for every i 2 J ,
0(i)  J and 2) for every i 2 J , 0(i) = Ci((i) [ 0(i)). A matching is a Core matching
if  it cannot be corewise blocked.2
2Note that the deﬁnition of  a corewise block allows for some blocking agents to have the same partners
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2.2.3 Conditions on Choice
We will assume throughout the analysis that every choice function satisﬁes the following
consistency condition.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Irrelevance of  Rejected Partners). A choice function Ci : 2Pi ! 2Pi of  an agent
i with partner set Pi satisﬁes the Irrelevance of Rejected Partners (IRP) condition if  for any
A;A0  Pi, Ci(A)  A0  A implies Ci(A0) = Ci(A).
This condition has appeared in various guises in both the classical matching literature
and in the literature on matching with contracts3. It is an essential requirement for stable
matchings to exist, as discussed in Aygün and Sönmez (2012a).
As discussed in the introduction, without some restriction on choice, neither Stable
nor Core matchings are guaranteed to exist. The following condition, Substitutability, has
played a critical role both in the theory of  matching and in the application of  matching to
market design problems.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (Substitutability). A choice function Ci : 2Pi ! 2Pi of  an agent i with partner
set Pi satisﬁes the Substitutability (Subs) condition if  for all j; k 2 Pi and A  Pinfj; kg,
j 62 Ci(A [ fjg) implies j 62 Ci(A [ fj; kg).
Essentially, a choice function satisﬁes Subs if  it is never the case that the addition of  some
new partner to the choice situation results in a rejected available partner now being chosen.
Equivalently, if  a chosen partner from a group of  chosen partners becomes unavailable, it
should not be the case that one (or more) of  the still available and chosen partners is rejected.
before and after the block, and so the core deﬁned here is the strict Core. There is also the notion of  a
groupwise block of  a matching  by a set of  agents J via 0, where for every i 2 J , 0(i)nJ  (i) and
0(i)  Ci((i) [ 0(i)). A matching is Groupwise Stable (GWS) if  there exists no groupwise block. Given
our many-to-one setting with no peer effects, it is straightforward to show that the set of  GWS matchings is
identical to the set of  Core matchings. See Echenique and Oviedo (2004) for a proof.
3See Blair (1988), Alkan (2001), Alkan (2002), Alkan and Gale (2003), Fleiner (2003), Echenique (2007),
and Aygün and Sönmez (2012a). See also Alva (2012), where this author shows that the IRP condition is
equivalent to the Weak Axiom of  Revealed Preference. Moreover, in the present context, the assumption of
IRP for a worker’s choice, given that no more than one partner is chosen, is equivalent to the assumption of  a
strict preference ordering.
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Deﬁnition 2.3. Workers w1 and w2 are subjective complements for ﬁrm f if  there exists a
choice situation A  Pf where both workers are available (w1; w2 2 A) and worker w1 is chosen
from A (w1 2 Cf (A)) but not chosen when the other worker w2 is removed from the choice situation
(w1 62 Cf (Anfw2g)).
Note that workers are subjective complements for a ﬁrm if  and only if  the ﬁrm’s choice
function does not satisfy the Subs condition. Thus, a choice function that has no subjective
complements satisﬁes Subs. The key result of  this paper is that not all complementarities
are bad for existence. Next, I describe two particular classes of  complementarity, with the
goal of  demonstrating that these are the problematic forms of  complementarity.
Subjective Imperfect and Subjective Asymmetric Complements
I deﬁne two novel types of  complementarity, Subjective Imperfect Complements and
Subjective Asymmetric Complements.
Deﬁnition 2.4 (Subjective Imperfect Complements). Workersw1 andw2 are Subjective Im-
perfect Complements (SIC) for ﬁrm f if:
1. w1 and w2 are subjective complements for ﬁrm f and
2. there exists Y 0 3 w1 where w2 2 Cf (Y 0) \ Cf (Y 0nfw1g).
A choice function proﬁle (Cf )f2F satisﬁes No Subjective Imperfect Complements (NSIC)
if  there does not exist any f 2 F , w1; w2 2 W such that w1 and w2 are SIC for f .
If  two workers w1 and w2 are Subjective Imperfect Complements for ﬁrm f , it means
that there are some situations where gaining access to w2 leads the ﬁrm to hire w1 but that
there are other situations wherew2 is hired despitew1 being unavailable. The contrapositive
can be stated as follows:
Deﬁnition 2.5. Workers w1 and w2 are Subjective Perfect Complements for ﬁrm f if  for
any Y , w1 2 Cf (Y ) if  and only if w2 2 Cf (Y ).
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This is a very particular type of  complementarity, where some workers are considered to
be valuable for a ﬁrm if  and only if  they are available as a team, and is a minimal weakening
of  the substitutes condition. In the next section, we shall see that it is relatively straightfor-
ward to show the existence of  the Stable set if  ﬁrm choice never contains Subjective Imper-
fect Complements.
The second type of  complementarity is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.6 (Subjective Asymmetric Complements). Workers w1 and w2 are Subjective
Asymmetric Complements (SAC) for ﬁrm f if  there exists Y  Pf such that
1. w1; w2 2 Cf (Y ),
2. w1 62 Cf (Y nfw2g) and
3. w2 2 Cf (Y nfw1g).
A choice function proﬁle (Cf )f2F satisﬁes No Subjective Asymmetric Complements (NSAC)
if  there does not exist any f 2 F , w1; w2 2 W such that w1 and w2 are SAC for f .
If  two workers w1 and w2 are Subjective Asymmetric Complements for ﬁrm f , it means
that there are some situations where losing access to w2 leads the ﬁrm to reject w1 but losing
access to w1 (in the same situation) does not induce the ﬁrm to reject w2, thereby treating
the two workers differently. The contrapositive of  the previous deﬁnition can be stated as
follows:
Deﬁnition 2.7. Workers w1 and w2 are Subjective Symmetric Complements for ﬁrm f if
for any Y where fw1; w2g  Cf (Y ), w1 62 Cf (Y nfw2g) implies w2 62 Cf (Y nfw1g).
Clearly, if w1 and w2 are Subjective Perfect Complements for f , they are Subjective
Symmetric Complements, but the converse is not true (see Example 2.7 below).
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2.3 The Theory of  Stability with Complementarities
2.3.1 The Trouble with Complementarity
For any matching problem, there necessarily exists a matching that is IS. In fact, the
empty matching, where no partnerships exist, is IS. If  both ﬁrms and workers can have at
most one partner then there exists a Stable4 matching. In this class of  problems, the Core
coincides with the Stable set, and so the Core is nonempty. However, in the many-to-one
class of  problems, the Core can be empty (and distinct from the Stable set), as demonstrated
in Examples 2.1 and 2.2. This also means that the set of  Groupwise Stable matchings is
empty (see footnote 2 for the deﬁnition of  this stability concept).
Example 2.1 (Empty Core). Suppose there are two ﬁrms f and f 0 and two workers w and
w0. The preferences of  workers are:
w: f 0 w f w ;
w0: f w0 f 0 w0 ;
and the preferences of  ﬁrms are:
f : fw;w0g f ;
f 0: w0 f 0 w f 0 ;.
For notational convenience, I identify a singleton set with the element it contains. Teams of
partners that are less preferred than being unmatched are omitted, for they have no impact
on the set of  Stable or Core matchings. It is straightforward to demonstrate that any choice
function generated by the maximization of  a strict preference relation over the available set
will satisfy IRP.
There is no Core matching for this problem. If f were to be matched to fw;w0g, then
J = ff 0; wg forms a corewise block via any matching where they partner with each other
4Recall that throughout this paper, for the sake of  brevity, stable refers to what is often known as pairwise
stable in the literature.
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exclusively. If f were to be matched with only one of w or w0, then this matching would
not be IS, because it would be individually blocked by f . Thus, f must be unmatched in
any Core matching. Assume this. If f 0 were to be unmatched, then J = ff 0; wg forms a
corewise block via any matching where they partner with each other exclusively. If f 0 were
to be matched with w, then J = ff 0; w0g forms a corewise block via any matching where
they partner with each other exclusively (we use the assumption that f is unmatched here).
Finally, if f 0 were to be matched withw0, then J = ff; w; w0g forms a corewise block. Thus,
all matching possibilities are exhausted, and the Core is empty.
Nevertheless, the Stable set is nonempty in Example 2.1, for the matching where f has
no workers and f 0 has worker w0 is Stable, because the only corewise block is ff; w; w0g,
which does not form a (pairwise) block. Since every Core matching is necessarily Stable,
this example demonstrates that the Core is generally a strict subset of  the Stable set. Unfor-
tunately, there exist matching problems where the Stable set is also empty.
Example 2.2 (Empty Stable set). Consider the same problem in Example 2.1 but with ﬁrm
f having the following preferences instead:
f : fw;w0g f w f ;
All the blocks involving two agents described in Example 2.1 continue to be blocks here.
Additionally, if f 0 were to be matched with w0 and f were to be unmatched, then f and w
form a block. If f were to be matched to w, then f and w0 form a block via the matching
that gives f both w and w0. Thus, no matching is immune to individual and blocks, and the
Stable set is empty.
These negative results demonstrate that some restriction on the domain of  the problem
is required to ensure existence of  these two solutions. The most general condition known to
guarantee existence of  the Core in the class of  many-to-one matching problems is a condi-
tion that rules out complementarities between potential partners, the Substitutes condition
(see Deﬁnition 2.2). The problem complementarity poses for existence is clear in Example
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2.1, where ﬁrm f would like to have both workers or neither of  them. In fact, as shown in
Example 2.2, it does not help that ﬁrm f might be ﬁne with one particular worker w if  both
are not available, since the other worker w0 is not acceptable to the ﬁrm by himself, and
thus w0 is complemented by w.5. In a setting where ﬁrms are assumed to have preferences
as primitives (yielding derived choice functions), the existence result states that the Core is
nonempty if  ﬁrms’ derived choice functions satisfy Subs (workers’ choice functions trivially
satisfy this condition). The importance of  the Subs condition for existence of  the Core has
been explored in many other models of  matching, both many-to-one and many-to-many,
where 1) agents match to each other directly (classical variety); 2) agents negotiate a salary
in addition to being matched (salary variety); or 3) agents match to each other via arbi-
trary contractual relations (contracts variety). For almost all these settings, the many-to-one
matching with contracts model being an exception, the Subs condition (with preferences
as primitives) is necessary for guaranteed existence of  the Core i.e. there is no Cartesian
product domain of  preferences that strictly contains this domain and guarantees existence
of  the Core.
As important as the Core concept may be, the assumption of  Substitutability is clearly a
strong one, limiting the scope of  the existing theory to problems where no complementarities
of  any sort exist. Focusing on the weaker solution concept of  Stability will not eliminate
the difﬁculty of  existence in the presence of  some complementarities, as demonstrated in
Example 2.2, but the question of  whether there exists a Cartesian product domain of  choice
functions more general than Substitutable domain that guarantees existence of  a nonempty
Stable set has not been previously asked or answered. It is clear from Example 2.1 that
complementarity does not automatically rule out the existence of  a Stable matching, but
this is also true about existence of  a Core matching, as shown in Example 2.3.
5This problem posed by complementarities was recognized by Kelso and Crawford (1982), who proposed
a condition on demand functions they called Gross Substitutability for a variant of  the many-to-one matching
model considered here that allows for salaries to be negotiated. Theirs is a quasilinear environment, which
is unnecessary for their existence result (a fact recognized by Kelso and Crawford). In the many-to-many
matching problem without salaries, the equivalent condition imposed on choice functions is Substitutability,
introduced in Roth (1984b)
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Example 2.3 (Nonempty Core does not imply Coincidence with the Stable Set). Consider
the same problem in Example 2.1 but with worker w having the following preferences in-
stead:
w: f w f 0 w ;
The matching  where f is matched to w and w0 and f 0 is unmatched is a Core matching,
since all matched agents receive their most-preferred partner set. This shows that the com-
plementarity of  ﬁrm f ’s preferences does not automatically rule out existence of  the Core.
Note, however, that the coincidence of  the Core with the Stable set is no longer true when
complementarities exist; the matching where ﬁrm f 0 is matched to w0 and the other agents
are unmatched is Stable (though not in the Core), since it is Individually Stable and no block
exists.
Even if  there is a coincidence of  the Core with the Stable set, the lattice structure that is
present when all choice functions satisfy Subs is lost.
Example 2.4 (Core = Stable 6= ; does not imply Canonical Lattice Structure). Suppose
there are two ﬁrms f and f 0 and three workers x, y, and z. The preferences of  ﬁrms are:
f : fx; yg f z f ;
f 0: z f 0 y f 0 x f 0 ;.
and the preferences of  workers are:
x: f x f 0 x ;
y: f 0 y f y ;
z: f z f 0 z ;
The Core for this problem contains two matchings,  and 0:
(f) = fx; yg; (f 0) = z
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and
0(f) = z; 0(f 0) = y:
The Stable set coincides with the Core. The matching  is the ﬁrm-optimal stable matching
and 0 the ﬁrm-pessimal stable matching. However, there is no worker-optimal or -pessimal
matching. Workers y and z prefer0 to but worker x prefers to0. The ﬁrm-proposing si-
multaneous deferred acceptance algorithm produces matching  and the worker-proposing
simultaneous deferred acceptance algorithm produces matching 0 (see the sequel for the
deﬁnition of  these algorithms).
2.3.2 Deferred Acceptance Algorithms
I describe two variants of  Deferred Acceptance algorithms, the worker-proposing simul-
taneous deferred acceptance algorithm (W-SimDAA algorithm) and the worker-proposing
sequential deferred acceptance algorithm (W-SeqDAA algorithm). The ﬁrst variant, W-
SimDAA, is just a convenient renaming of  the Gale-Shapley’s student-proposing deferred
acceptance algorithm (Gale and Shapley (1962)). The second variant, W-SeqDAA, is a for-
malization of  the algorithm used by Dubins and Freedman (1981).
Simultaneous DAA
The worker-proposing simultaneous deferred acceptance algorithm (W-SimDAA) consists of  a se-
quence of  rounds, with each round consisting of  two stages. In the ﬁrst stage of  every round,
every worker w 2 W that is not currently held (was rejected in the previous round) by some
ﬁrm proposes to his most preferred partner in its partner set Pw to which he has not previously
proposed. In the second stage of  every round, every ﬁrm f 2 F chooses (holds) its most pre-
ferred set of  workers from amongst those it is holding from the previous round and those
who have newly proposed in this round, rejecting the unchosen workers. Since in the ﬁrst
round no worker was previously rejected, every worker proposes to some acceptable ﬁrm
(unless there are no ﬁrms that the worker ﬁnds acceptable). The algorithm terminates at the
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beginning of  a round where all workers are held or have no more acceptable ﬁrms left to
which to propose.
The W-SimDAA ends in a ﬁnite number of  steps. This is because in any round where
at least one worker is rejected, that worker will move down his list of  acceptable ﬁrms and
will never make a second offer to a ﬁrm that has rejected him. Since the number of  ﬁrms is
ﬁnite, the number of  rounds has to be ﬁnite.
Next, consider the outcome of  the W-SimDAA. It is feasible by construction, since no
worker can be matched to more than one ﬁrm. Is it individually stable? Yes, since in every
round, ﬁrms choose from amongst the union of  the workers held from the previous round
and the new offers, the choice from which, given IRP of  choice functions, is an individually
stable set. The outcome is individually rational for workers because no worker makes an
offer to an unacceptable ﬁrm.
For arbitrary choice functions for ﬁrms (that satisfy IRP), there is no guarantee that the
outcome of  the W-SimDAA is Stable. Nevertheless, it is well-known (Kelso and Crawford
(1982), Roth (1984b)) that under the assumption of  Subs, the outcome is not only Stable,
but also in the Core.
Sequential DAA
The worker-proposing sequential deferred acceptance algorithm (W-SimDAA), parametrized by an
linear ordering B over the set of  workers W , consists of  a sequence of  rounds, each round
consisting of  two stages. In the ﬁrst stage of  a round, the highest-ranked worker, according
to B, that is not held by a ﬁrm and has not yet proposed to every acceptable ﬁrm proposes
to his most-preferred acceptable ﬁrm that has previously rejected him. In the second stage
of  a round, the ﬁrm which received a proposal in this round chooses its most preferred set
of  workers from amongst those it is holding from the previous round and the newly arrived
worker, rejecting the unchosen ones. The algorithm terminates at the beginning of  a round
where all workers are held or have no more acceptable ﬁrms left at which to propose.
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Fix an order B. The W-SeqDAA ends in a ﬁnite number of  steps and always produces
an Individually Stable matching, for the same reason that these properties are true of  the W-
SimDAA. If  every ﬁrm’s choice function satisﬁes Subs, then the outcome of  the W-SeqDAA
and of  the W-SimDAA are equivalent (regardless of  the ordering B), and is thus Stable and
in the Core. Without Subs, however, Stability is not assured.
An Example Illustrating the Difference in Algorithms
Example 2.5. 6 Suppose there are three ﬁrms f , g, and h and three workers w1, w2, and
w3. The preferences of  ﬁrms are:
f : fw1; w2g f ;
g: fw2; w3g g ;
h: fw3; w1g h ;
and the preferences of  workers are:
w1: g w1 f w1 h w1 ;
w2: g w2 f w2 h w2 ;
w3: f w3 h w3 g w3 ;
There are four pairwise stable matchings:
1(f) = fw1; w2g; 1(g) = 1(h) = ;
2(g) = fw2; w3g; 2(h) = 2(f) = ;
3(h) = fw3; w1g; 3(f) = 3(g) = ;
4(f) = 4(g) = 4(h) = ;
6The following example was suggested by Hideo Konishi.
68
The Core is empty. The W-SimDAA produces 1. In the ﬁrst round, workers w1, w2, w3
propose to ﬁrms g, g, and f , respectively. Firm g rejects the proposals of  both w1 and w2
and ﬁrm f rejects w3. In the second round, workers w1, w2, w3 propose to ﬁrms f , f , and
h, respectively. Firm f accepts the proposal of  workers w1 and w2, while ﬁrm h rejects the
proposal of  workers w3. In the third round, worker w3 proposes to ﬁrm g, which rejects
him. At the beginning of  the fourth round there are no workers who have any ﬁrms left to
propose to so the algorithm terminates, with the matching 1 being realized.
On the other hand, the W-SeqDAA produces 4, regardless of  the orderB over workers.
Notice that 4 is weakly Pareto dominated by each of 1, 2, and 3.
2.3.3 The Basic Theory
Illustrating NSIC and NSAC
To understand better the novel choice conditions of  NSIC and NSAC, consider the
following three examples.
Example 2.6. Suppose a ﬁrm f has the following preferences over the set of  partners
Pf  fw1; w2; w3g:
f : fw1; w2; w3g f fw1; w2g f fw3g f ;.
Workers w1 and w2 are (the only) subjective complements. Since w1 is chosen if  and only if
w2 is chosen, the choice function of  ﬁrm f satisﬁes NSIC (and so NSAC).
Example 2.7. Suppose a ﬁrm f has the following preferences over the set of  partners
Pf  fw1; w2; w3g:
f : fw1; w2g f fw1; w3g f fw2; w3g f ;.
Any pair of  workers are subjective complements for ﬁrm f . However, no pair of  workers
are Subjective Perfect Complements. For example, w1 can be teamed with w2 or w3 (but
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not both), so ﬁrm f does not consider w1 and w2 to be acceptable only if  hired together.
Thus, Cf derived from f failed the NSIC condition.
However, the NSAC condition is satisﬁed. For any team fwi; wjg, i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g and
i 6= j, the removal of  one member results in the rejection of  the other. Finally, if  all three
workers are available, note that removal of w1 does not result in the rejection of w2, and vice
versa, and removal of w3 leaves the chosen team intact, illustrating that Cf satisﬁes the IRP
condition.
Example 2.8. Suppose a ﬁrm f has the following preferences over the set of  partners
Pf  fw1; w2; w3; w4g:
f : fw1; w2g f fw1; w3g f fw2; w3g f w4 f ;.
The restriction of  the choice function Cf to the subset fw1; w2; w3g is equivalent to the
choice function in Example 2.7, and so does not contain any violation of  NSAC. Moreover,
in situations wherew4 is available, he is not chosen unless one or fewer of  the workersw1,w2,
and w3 is available, again implying that the complementary pairs are chosen in a symmetric
fashion, even though no group of  workers are subjective perfect complements.
Now, suppose instead that ﬁrm f had the following, slightly modiﬁed, preference rank-
ing:
f : fw1; w2g f fw1; w3g f w4 f fw2; w3g f ;.
Consider choice situation Y = Pf . Both w1 and w2 are chosen from Y . However, while
removal of w1 from the choice set leads to w2 being let go, the converse is not true, since
fw1; w3g is preferred to w4. Thus, the choice condition NSAC is violated.
Results
The main result of  this paper is the following existence theorem for Stable matchings.
Theorem 2.1. If  the choice function of  every ﬁrm satisﬁes the NSAC condition, then the Stable set is
nonempty.
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The proof  of  existence is shown by demonstrating that, for any given order B, the W-
SeqDAA produces a matching that is Stable. However, as the following example shows,
even if  NSAC is satisﬁed, the Stable matching produced by W-SeqDAA is dependent upon
the order B over W .
Example 2.9 (Order Dependence of  W-SeqDAA). Even if  every ﬁrms’ choice function
satisﬁes NSAC, the Stable matching produced by W-SeqDAA depends upon the order B.
Suppose the preferences of  the only ﬁrm f over partners Pf  fw1; w2; w3; w4g are:
f : fw1; w2g f fw3; w4g f w1 f w2 f w3 f w4 f ;,
and all workers prefer f to being unmatched. There are two Stable matchings, 1(f) =
fw1; w2g and 2(f) = fw3; w4g. Suppose the order B1 : w1; w2; w3; w4 is used with W-
SeqDAA. Then matching 1 is produced. If  instead the order B2 : w4; w3; w2; w1 is used,
the matching 2 is produced.
The next result relates the NSIC condition (which is stronger than NSAC) and the better-
known version of  the deferred acceptance algorithm, the W-SimDAA.
Theorem 2.2. If  the choice function proﬁle of  ﬁrms satisﬁes the NSIC condition, then the W-SimDAA
yields a Stable matching.
The following example demonstrates that the W-SimDAA produces an unstable match-
ing even when a Stable (and a Core) matching exists, if  the NSIC condition is violated.
Example 2.10. Suppose there are two ﬁrms f and g and three workers w1, w2, and w3.
The preferences of  ﬁrms are:
f : fw1; w2; w3g f fw1; w2g f fw2; w3g f fw3; w1g f ;
g : w1 g ;
and the preferences of  workers are :
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w1: f w1 g w1 ;
w2: g w2 f w2 ;
w3: g w3 f w3 ;
The only Core matching is ^: ^(f) = fw1; w2; w3g and ^(g) = ;. The matching
~(f) = ; and ~(g) = w1 is the only other Stable matching. However, the W-SimDAA
produces the matching 0: 0(f) = fw2; w3g and 0(g) = w1, which is blocked by ﬁrm f
and worker w1. Note that ﬁrm f ’s choice function violates the NSIC condition because in
situation Y = fw2; w3g, fw2; w3g  C(Y ), but in situation Y 0 = fw1; w2g, fw2; w3g 6
C(Y 0) and fw2; w3g \ C(Y 0) 6= ;.
With the W-SeqDAA (with any order), the Stable matching ~ will be realized.
2.4 Conclusion
Complementarities are an important feature of  many real-world markets, including
market-design applications such as the National Residency Matching Program for doctors
and hospitals, and supply-chain networks. Nevertheless, complementarities has always been
theoretically difﬁcult to deal with, and this is no exception in matching theory. In this pa-
per, we have a positive theory of  pairwise stable matchings for a new domain of  preferences
that allows for a class of  complementarities called subjective symmetric complementarities.
However, other than existence, few of  the positive results from the theory under substitutable
choice survive in the new domain.
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Chapter 3
Electoral Competition and Social
Inﬂuence Networks
3.1 Introduction
The greatest deception men suffer is from their own opinions.
Leonardo da Vinci, The Notebooks of  Leonardo da Vinci
Consider the US presidential race in 2008 between the Republican candidate Senator
John McCain and Democratic candidate Senator Barack Obama. The two main dimen-
sions of  the debate about the candidates’ qualiﬁcations and abilities to be the president were
national security and economic policy. McCain had strong national security credentials,
both by virtue of  individual achievements and by association with the Republican Party.
Obama, on the other hand, was a more technocratic candidate particularly on economic
matters, in no small part because of  his afﬁliation with the Democratic Party. Given this
framing of  the debate between McCain and Obama as one about the relative importance
of  terrorism versus the economy, both McCain and Obama spent a signiﬁcant amount of
time and resources making and publicizing statements about what they believed to be the
more important class of  issues facing the country: McCain played up the importance of
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national security and the threat of  terrorism, while Obama instead called attention to the
importance of  dealing with a failing economy.1
The candidates disagreed on what the true state of  the world was, even though they
both had access to a great deal of  information, most of  which came from the same sources.
While some differences in their information could have lead to their different opinions, it
is unlikely that these differences could have resulted is such vast differences in their opin-
ions about the importance of  the issue of  terrorism relative to that of  the economy. I argue
that this difference-of-stated-opinion is the equilibrium outcome of  a game between the
candidates, where each candidate publicly states his opinion about the state of  the world,
commonly known to the candidates, and the population, each member of  which has some
private opinion, learns from others in the population and from the candidates’ stated opin-
ions.
I investigate the role of  persuasion within social inﬂuence networks in generating pol-
icy polarization in electoral competition. Voters have single-peaked policy preferences and
candidates are ideological, with single-peaked policy preferences as well. The impact of
policy, however, is state-dependent, where the state of  the world can be understood as the
relationship between an underlying set of  outcomes that voters actually care about and the
manner in which particular policies translate into outcomes. Due to their uncertainty about
the true state, voters update their opinions about the true state, learning only from their so-
cial neighbors, described by a social inﬂuence network. The candidates have targets within
this network, which captures the media penetration of  candidates, and thus inﬂuence voters
directly through the media and indirectly through other voters.
Focusing on a symmetric setting, I ﬁnd that a unique pure strategy equilibrium exists
under some reasonable parameter restrictions, where in the ﬁrst stage of  the game the two
competing parties choose policies and public opinions, and then in the second stage the
population engages in social learning to update their opinions followed by a voting stage.
1McCain famously stated that “[T]he fundamentals of  our economy are strong” in an attempt to downplay
the importance of  economic issues.
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I show that there is a substitution effect at work between the persuasion strategy through
public opinions and the policy position. The persuasion dimension is like a tug-of-war, be-
cause a party “pulls” the distribution of  voters’s ideal policies towards its ideological position,
while the policy dimension has the usual moderation towards the median. Opening up this
new dimension of  competition (by lowering the cost of  the persuasion channel) can result in
a substitution away from moderation along the policy dimension, leading to greater policy
polarization and persistent population differences in opinion about the state of  the world.
Homophily exacerbates these polarization effects by reducing competition for centrist votes.
A large fraction of  the population are non-partisan in their preferences over potential
candidates – members of  the population have state-dependent preferences over the two can-
didates, where the state of  the world includes such aspects as the condition of  the economy
and of  foreign relations. I focus on this segment of  the population, assuming the remaining
members are ideological in their voting behavior, and thus unimportant in the candidates’
strategic consideration of  policy platform and public opinion. In particularly, there are
some states of  the world where a non-partisan voter would prefer the left-party policy but
other states of  the world where he would prefer the right-party policy, for any given pair
of  policies from the left and right party. Voters state-dependent preferences over policy are
comonotonic, which means that for any pair of  policies when the state increases no voter
who preferred the more rightist policy would now prefer the more leftist policy. In the
example of  the competition between McCain/Republicans and Obama/Democrats, the
commonly-held dimension of  preferences is that as the economy becomes a bigger issue rel-
ative to terrorism, all voters would agree that Obama’s leftist policy is a (weakly-) better that
McCain’s rightist policy.
Political parties expend a great deal of  effort persuading voters to adopt particular beliefs
about the true state of  the world. A party will point to evidence supporting their assessment
about the state of  the world, and frequently the other party will proffer a different assessment
about the state of  the world, generally by pointing to other pieces of  evidence (often through
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ﬁltering out information that is not favorable).
When a voter becomes aware of  the candidates’ public opinion, the voter must account
for the difference by considering the above three explanations. A rational Bayesian voter
would recognize that political candidates have a strategic reason to present particular pieces
of  evidence or to espouse a particular belief  about the unknown state. The extent to which
a voter could extract information from the espoused belief  of  a political candidate depends,
amongst other things, upon that voter’s prior about the candidate’s type. The information
extraction problem would also require that the voter have a prior about the types of  all
the other voters, and furthermore require that the voter understand the formation of  the
equilibrium and hence the equilibrium bias in the candidates’ espoused beliefs.
Alternatively, the voter could use some heuristic to determine how much he discounts
the beliefs of  the candidates, and in that manner attempt to correct for candidate bias in
stated beliefs. This behavioral assumption weakens the conditions on both the amount of
information about the structure of  the world (preferences and types of  other voters and of
candidates) and the level of  rationality required by a voter, a bounded rationality approach
that I pursue in this paper.
The boundedly rational learning model is quite ﬂexible and intuitive, because with multi-
dimensional opinions, different dimensions can have different weights. Consider a particular
topic of  interest, for example the health effects of  genetically-modiﬁed foods. Some people
have an a priori interest in the topic while others less so. Moreover, given that topic, a person
has an associated inﬂuence network, which indicates how much the person trusts the opinion
of  another. These inﬂuence networks reﬂect the history of  previous interactions and the local
knowledge the person has about the expertise of  her network neighbors. The opinion of  a
friend with knowledge about or training in genetics is given more credence that the opinion
of  a friend with no background in the subject, but this latter friend’s opinion may well be
given more credence than the opinion of  a completely unknown geneticist. I do not build a
general theory of  such inﬂuence networks, but rather assume the existence of  such networks
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in order to study the evolution and long-run state of  opinions about a given topic, particularly
when some agents are strategic in their choice of  opinions. To be more clear, I assume that
some agents can freely “choose” their opinions, while others use the local averaging heuristic
to form their opinions. The agents that choose their opinions are deemed strategic, while
those using the heuristic capturing the idea of  persuadability are deemed boundedly rational
or behavioral. For the purposes of  this paper, the strategic agents are two political parties,
and the behavioral agents are a voting populace.
Robinson (1976) examines the two-step ﬂow hypothesis in a national election campaign.
The two-step ﬂow hypothesis posits that ideas ﬂow from mass media to opinion leaders, and
then from opinion leaders to less interested sections of  the population, and is the paradigm
that is modeled in this paper, using social inﬂuence networks. Pattie and Johnston (1999)
furnish evidence from the 1992 British Election Study demonstrating political discussion
with partisans inﬂuences the vote of  undecided voters. The importance of  social networks
for decision-making in a variety of  settings has been well-documented and studied. For
example, the diffusion of  microcredit in India has been shown to depend crucially on the
structure of  the social network (Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duﬂo, Jackson (2012)).
Banks (1990) analyzes electoral competition when voters are uncertain about the policy
the winning candidate will enact i.e. the policy position announcement is not assumed to
be carried out. Essentially, his paper constructs a signaling model that yields a weakening of
the convergence result of  the standard median voter model. Along different lines, Roemer
(1997) demonstrated that policy convergence need not occur when there is uncertainty about
the median voter’s policy ideal and when candidates are motivated by policy rather than the
spoils of  ofﬁce.
Glaeser et al. (2005) explain that extremism in the messages of  candidates arise when
afﬁliates of  a candidate’s party have a higher probability of  learning about the platform
than other citizens, and as a result deviation from the median towards the position of  the
party afﬁliates energizes the party base, therefore increasing turnout of  loyalists more than
77
the opposing party’s base. That the deviation is less likely to be detected by non-afﬁliates
implies that the opposing party base is relatively less energized.
Galeotti and Mattozzi (2011) is the only paper I am aware of  that examines the effect of
homophily in social networks on electoral competition.2 They consider a citizen-candidate
model with two parties, where voters are uncertain about the type of  the candidates repre-
senting each party. Parties can choose to advertise truthfully their candidate’s type, but pay
a cost convex in the share of  the population reached. Voters then randomly sample a ﬁnite
subset of  the population for any information on candidate types, update their beliefs in a
Bayesian manner and then vote. In mixed-strategy equilibria, they ﬁnd that the probability
that a more extreme candidate wins can decrease when the cost of  advertising decreases.3
This paper differs in a number of  crucial ways. Most importantly, I study the impor-
tance of  the structure of  the social network by explicitly modeling a social learning model,
albeit one where individuals are boundedly rational. The power of  this framework is that
many questions related to communication structure and media can be handled in a tractable
and realistic manner. Secondly, the nature of  informational problem is different in the two
models. I focus on the role of  a second dimension of  competition, the role of  opinion and
“spin”, in shaping the perceptions of  policy efﬁcacy, and thus altering voting behavior. This
allows me to simultaneously answer questions relating to polarization in party platforms and
polarization in population beliefs about the state of  the world. For example, there is a lot
of  disagreement about the impact of  government debt levels on economic growth, and thus
the size of  ﬁscal stimulus through government spending. An individual’s policy preference
depends not just on the policy devoid of  context, but on the theory of  the world that connects
policies to outcomes. I maintain that the more relevant uncertainty for voters is not the pol-
icy platform of  a party, but the relationship between policy and outcomes that is captured
by the state of  the world.
2Lever (2010) studies Colonel Blotto games of  inﬂuence on a social network, focusing on how the network
structure affects where two parties will allocate a ﬁxed amount of  resources.
3They do not make clear in the paper when this is a monotonic relationship. The equilibrium condition is
an implicit function of  the strategy so the analysis is not straightforward.
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There is a vast literature on learning, and a growing one on learning in networks. In this
paper, voters learn about the underlying state of  the world by truthfully sharing4 their best
guess about the state of  the world with each person in their immediate social network. Golub
and Jackson (2010) dub this “naïve” learning, because the agents fail to account for repetition
of  information from common but distant-in-the-network people. DeMarzo et al. (2003)
introduced this boundedly-rational Bayesian learner model to the economics, but studied
the implications for a more limited set of  networks than Golub and Jackson (2010). However,
DeMarzo et al. (2003) furnish a defense for this boundedly-rational behavior, documenting
evidence of  what they term persuasion bias, which is deﬁned to be the overweighting of
repeated but uninformative signals in updating beliefs.
3.2 A Framework for Elections with Inﬂuenceable Vot-
ers
3.2.1 The Elements
There is a population of  voters modeled as a measure space ~V with measure  where
(~V) = 1. The policy space X is one-dimensional and taken to be equivalent to R. The
effect of  a policy x 2 X on outcomes and hence a voter’s utility depends upon the state
of  the world  2   R. Voters have single-peaked preferences over X , where voter i’s
ideal policy x^i is a function of  the state of  the world , given by x^i() = x^i + b, and
measurable over ~V . For example, voters might have utility ui(x; ) =  a2(x   x^i   b)2.
When convenient, I will assume this utility function, but most results do not depend upon
the exact form of  the single-peaked preferences.
The population ~V is partitioned into the measurable subsets L;R; fNngn2N for some
4Other papers about learning in networks include Bala and Goyal (1998) and Acemoglu et al. (2008), but
here the agents learn not through truthful communication but through observation of  actions and outcomes
in the case of Bala and Goyal (1998) and just of  actions in the case of Acemoglu et al. (2008). Since my interest
here is to understand how candidates might use the fact that people are susceptible to persuasion bias, I have
chosen to work with the simpler and tractable naïve learning model.
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N  f1; : : : ; N 2 Ng, where N is used to indicate both the set and its cardinality. Deﬁne
V  Sn2N Nn. Let n  (Nn) for all n 2 N . There are two political parties labeled L
and R, the strategic agents in the model. The two sets L and R are party members associated
with party L and party R, respectively, and the other sets consist of N groups (types) of
independent voters (the setV ). PartyL represents the interests of  the voter groupL and party
R represents the interests of  voter groupR. The policy preferences of  party p 2 fL;Rg are
single-peaked over X , with ideal policies x^p() = x^p + b, where x^p is the average of  the
ideal policies of  the corresponding party members p.5
The political parties know the true state of  the world , which I normalize to zero, but
the voters do not. Each voter i has an initial opinion about the true state of  the world 0i ,
measurable over V . The average of  every voter’s opinion 0  RV 0i (di) is . Parties also
have public opinions about the state of  the world, denoted L and R. These publicly-held
opinions are strategic opinions and need not be equal to the true state. The opinion of  a
voter can be inﬂuenced by the opinions of  other voters and of  the candidates. The process
by which social inﬂuence affects the opinion of  a voter will be described later. The ﬁnal
opinion of  a voter will depend upon the public opinions L; R. Let M be the space of  all
measurable functions from V to . Then the process by which voter opinions change from
0 to their ﬁnal opinion 1 is modeled by an operator M on M, the inﬂuence operator,
that depends upon the opinions L and R of  the parties.
Let 	 denote the share of  votes for party R. The utility function for party R is
UR  	  x
2
(xR   x^R)2   
2
(R   )2
5This aggregation can be justiﬁed rigorously by assuming all voters i in party p have quadratic utility
ui(x; ) =  a2 (x   x^i()) with x^i distributed according to some density function fp(x^i). Then if  the
party utility is just the average utility of  its members, the party utility has the quadratic utility representa-
tion up(x; ) = E[ui(x; )] =  a2 (x  x^p)2   a2 var[x^i]. Since the variance term is independent of x and ,
we can ignore it.
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and the utility function for party L is
UL  1 	  x
2
(xL   x^L)2   
2
(L   )2:
Parties derive utility from vote share rather than just winning an election. Parties com-
peting for seats in a proportional representation legislative body would have marginal in-
centives for votes that are roughly constant. For presidential elections the marginal incen-
tives are nonlinear, potentially even discontinuous. However, if  the population votes in a
probabilistic fashion, then the marginal incentives are approximately linear in symmetric
equilibria, and so the vote share maximization model is a reasonable model. When a sym-
metric equilibrium exists in a model with a commonly known state (so that persuasion plays
no role) and no policy preferences (x = 0), the equilibrium policy choice is the same with
either vote-share maximization or winning probability maximization.
Parties derive utility from the policy they propose. Alternatively, parties bear an ideolog-
ical cost from proposing policies different from their ideal. This could reﬂect a reputation
cost to the party, left as a primitive, of  compromising on policy.
Finally, parties face a cost6 of  holding public opinions that differ from the true state of
the world, which reﬂects the cost of  maintaining party line and being more aggressive in
efforts to distort the truth. Depending upon the interpretation of  the model, this could also
be thought of  as the cost of  inﬂuencing voters such as through advertising.
Party members L and R always cast votes for their respective parties, unless otherwise
speciﬁed. Non-partisan voters cast their vote according to the utility they would derive from
having the proposed policy in place, given their opinion of  the state of  the world. If  both
proposed policies yield the same utility, the voter randomizes with equal probability. Given
the opinions of  the population V , let F (V) : X ! [0; 1] be the conditional distribution of
the ideal policies of V , and let FNn(V) : X ! [0; 1] be the conditional distribution of  the
6The assumption of  quadratic ideological or opinion costs is only made for expositional convenience. Cost
functions that are strictly convex, symmetric about the policy ideal/true state of  the world and twice continu-
ously differentiable would sufﬁce.
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ideal policies of Nn. Let f(V) : X ! R and fNn(V) : X ! R be the corresponding con-
ditional density functions7 of  the ideal policies over the policy space X . These distributions
and densities will be parameterized and studied in subsequent sections.
3.2.2 Political Equilibrium
The electoral competition game takes place in three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the an-
nouncement stage, parties choose their policy xL; xR and their public opinion L; R. In the
second stage, the opinion updating stage, voters update their opinions. In the ﬁnal stage, the
election stage, voters cast their votes, without abstention, and the outcome of  the election and
payoffs are realized.
A strategy for a party k 2 fL;Rg is a policy and opinion pair (xk; k) 2 X .
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Political Equilibrium). A political equilibrium8 is a strategy proﬁle ((xL; L); (xR; R))
such that:
• The ﬁnal opinion 1 of  voters is given by 1 =M(L; R)0.
• Partisans vote for their party and others vote for the party with the most preferred equilibrium policy,
breaking ties independently and uniformly at random:
– i 2 V votes for R if ui(xR; 1i ) > ui(xL; 1i )
– i 2 V votes for L if ui(xR; 1i ) < ui(xL; 1i )
– i 2 V votes forR with probability 1
2
(independently of  others) if ui(xR; 1i ) = ui(xL; 1i )
• For k; k0 2 fL;Rg with k 6= k0, Uk(xk; k; xk0 ; k0)  Uk(~x; ~; xk0 ; k0) for all ~x 2 X
and ~ 2 .
Through the opinion update operatorM(L; R), the distribution and density functions
of  voter ideal policy are parametrized by L and R; we continue to denote this functions by
FNn and fNn , indicating the party opinions when useful. Deﬁne x = xR+xL2 , x = xR xL,
7We will make assumptions later that guarantee the existence of  these density functions.
8 We will focus only on pure-strategy equilibria in this paper.
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 =
R+L
2
and  = R  L. Then, x is a measure of  the level of  policy polarization and
 a measure of  the level of  opinion polarization. We will study how these two dimensions
of  polarization are affected in equilibrium by changes in the fundamentals of  the economy,
such as the network structure, the preferences of  voters, or ideological and opinion distortion
costs of  parties.
3.3 Elections with Naïve Social Learning: Two Types
No man is an island entire of  itself…
John Donne, Devotions upon Emergent Occasions, Meditation XVII
There are two groups of  voters, in addition to the partisan groups L and R, i.e. N = 2,
with (N1) = (N2) = 1. Voters i from group Nn have ideal policies given by x^i() =
x^n +x^i + bi, where x^i is a mean zero independent random variable with a symmetric
single-peaked distribution hn with full support on X and where x^n is a group-speciﬁc pa-
rameter (the average ideal policy for the group when i = 0 for all i 2 Nn). Note that all
random variables xi with i 2 V are independent of  each other.
We will assume that x^1 =  x^2 and h1 = h2 = h, so that, given a ﬁxed opinion V com-
mon to all voters, the distribution of  ideal policies is symmetric about zero, the center of  the
policy space (according to our normalization). Assume that voters have distance preferences
symmetric about the ideal policy9
Thus, fNn the density of  ideal policies for voters in Nn can be derived from h; x^n and
Nn . Moreover, the vote share function 	 can be deﬁned as follows:
	 

1
2
  1

| {z }
partisan vote
+1
Z 1
x
(fN1(x) + fN2(x)) dx
where x  xR+xL2 is the midpoint between the policies proposed by the two parties.
9Utility of  a policy is a function of  the Euclidean distance between the policy and the ideal policy (such
that single-peakedness is preserved).
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3.3.1 The Social Inﬂuence Network: Two Types
Consider a voter i from some group n 2 N . Voter i has an initial opinion about the
true state of  the world, which denoted 0i . In the course of  the electoral campaign, the voter
engages in discussions with other voters (of  his and of  other groups) about the state of  the
world and in the process changes his opinion. The voter also pays attention to the opinions
of  the two candidates L and R about the state of  the world, affecting his opinion. The voter
updates his opinion by taking a weighted average of  the opinions of  all voters and candidates
opinions, where weights could be zero to reﬂect no (valuable) interaction.
Let i be the fraction of  attention that voter i devotes to the candidates/partisans, and
1   i be the fraction devoted to the non-partisan citizenry. Of  the fraction 1   i, let i
be towards members of  the same group and 1   i be towards members of  other groups.
Of  the fraction i, group N1 voters divide their attention in i to party/group L and 1  i
to party/group R, while group N2 voters divide their attention in 1   i to L and i to R.
Voter i 2 N1 updates his opinion according to the rule
t+1i =
R
N1(1  j)jtj1(dj)R
N1(1  j)j1(dj)
+
R
N2(1  j)(1  j)tj2(dj)R
N2(1  j)(1  j)2(dj)
+ ii
t
L + i(1  i)tR
(3.1a)
and voter i 2 N2 updates opinions according to the analogous rule
t+1i =
R
N1(1  j)(1  j)tj1(dj)R
N1(1  j)(1  j)1(dj)
+
R
N2(1  j)jtj2(dj)R
N2(1  j)j2(dj)
+ i(1  i)tL + iitR:
(3.1b)
To avoid serious technical difﬁculties with measurability of  the opinions of  voters V , we
will assume that all voters in the same group have the same values of ,  and .10 With
this assumption, it is clear that
R
N1(1  j)jtj1(dj) = (1  1)1
R
N1 
t
j1(dj). Similarly,
10In fact, we can easily relax the assumption of  identical  across voters of  the same group, but none of  the
results would be altered by this additional complexity.
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the network parameters can be extracted from the other integrals in these updating rules.
However, for the integrals to be well deﬁned, we need t to be a measurable function.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose 0, the initial opinions of  the voters, is a measurable function with respect to the
measure space V of  voters. Then, for any n 2 f1; 2g and i 2 Nn, the update rules in equations 3.1a and
3.1b are well deﬁned.
Proof. Proceed by induction. First, suppose t is a measurable function for a given t. Since
each of  the sets N1 and N2 are measurable subsets of V , then t+1i is well deﬁned for all
i 2 V . This follows because i and i are measurable functions on V by virtue of  being
constants over N1 and over N2, and so the integrals in equations 3.1a and 3.1b are well
deﬁned.
Next, to establish the induction step, we need to show that t+1 is a measurable function
on V . Deﬁne tNn 
R
Nn 
t
in(di)R
Nn n(di)
for n 2 f1; 2g, the average opinion of  each of  the two
groups, which is well deﬁned as just established. But then equation 3.1a at time t + 1 can
be written as
t+1i = (1  1)1tN1 + (1  1)(1  1)tN2 + 11tL + 1(1  1)tR
which is independent of i for all i 2 N1. Then, t+1i = t+1i0 for all i; i0 2 N1. The analogous
argument applied to equation 3.1b yields the conclusion that t+1i = 
t+1
i0 for all i; i0 2 N2.
Thus, t+1 is a measurable function on V . Since we have assumed that 0 is a measurable
function, we have the base case for induction.
So, we can rewrite equations 3.1a and 3.1b as
t+1i2N1 = (1  1)1tN1 + (1  1)(1  1)tN2 + 11tL + 1(1  1)tR (3.2a)
t+1i2N2 = (1  2)(1  2)tN1 + (1  2)2tN2 + 2(1  2)tL + 22tR (3.2b)
In order to study the evolution of  opinions in the population, let us study ﬁrst the evolution
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of  the group averages. Integrating the individual opinion updating equations we get
t+1N1 = (1  1)1tN1 + (1  1)(1  1)tN2 + 11tL + 1(1  1)tR
t+1N2 = (1  2)(1  2)tN1 + (1  2)2tN2 + 2(1  2)tL + 22tR
which written in matrix form is264t+1N1
t+1N2
375
| {z }
t+1
=
264 (1  1)1 (1  1)(1  1)
(1  2)(1  2) (1  2)2
375
| {z }
A
264tN1
tN2
375
| {z }
t
+
264 11 1(1  1)
2(1  2) 22
375
| {z }
B
264tL
tR
375
| {z }
tK
or more concisely
t+1 = At +BtK : (3.3)
The opinion update weights A and B are assumed to be a constant during the updating
process. The weights in A could be interpreted as the product of  the probability that voters
i and j discuss opinions and the persuasiveness of j from the perspective of i. Similarly, B
can be interpreted as the product of  the probability that voter i pays attention to candidate
k through various media or to members of  this candidates party and the persuasiveness of
k from the perspective of i.
As discussed previously, candidates choose their opinions strategically at the beginning of
the opinion updating process (i.e. at time 0) and do not subsequently change these opinions,
so we know that tk = 0k = k for all t 2 N. Moreover, with our focus on symmetric
environments, we have that 1 = 2 = , 1 = 2 =  and 1 = 2 = . To avoid the
trivial situation where voters cannot be inﬂuenced, I assume that  > 0.
I assume that the election stage takes place after a sufﬁciently large number of  rounds
of  updating, so that the opinions of  the voters are arbitrarily well-approximated by the limit
opinion limt!1 t, which I call the equilibrium voter opinions. Proposition 3.1 describes the
equilibrium weights voters place on the opinions of  the candidates. The weights are a func-
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tion of  the network parameters ,  and . Figure 3.1 shows a schematic diagram of  the
social inﬂuence network. The parameter  captures the overall penetration of  non-partisan
(1 - γ) η
(1 - γ) η
(1 - γ) (1-η)
(1 - γ)(1-η)
γv γv
γ(1-v)γ(1-v)
L R
Group 1
Group 2
Figure 3.1: Schematic of  a symmetric network with two groups of  voters N1 and N2
citizen networks by party candidates and members, with relevant values ranging from 
close to zero when parties have very little inﬂuence to  close to one when parties directly
determine opinions of  the voters. The parameter  describes the direct listening bias of  a
group of  non-partisan voters to their corresponding party, with  = 1
2
indicating no bias
and  = 0 or  = 1 indicating maximal bias (for one of  the two parties). Finally  is a
measure of  homophily with  = 1
2
indicating no homophily (in our symmetric case with
(N1) = (N2)) and  = 1 indicating maximal homophily, where voters are only inﬂu-
enced by members of  their own group. Assume that   1
2
. This is without loss of  generality
since we can relabel the groups to achieve this condition.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose  > 0. Then, limt!1 t exists. Moreover, the equilibrium opinion of
voter i 2 N1 is given by 1i = (w + 12)L + (12   w)R and that of  voter i 2 N2 is given by
1i = (
1
2
 w)L + (12 +w)R, where w =
(  1
2
)
1 2(1 )(  1
2
)
is the equilibrium inﬂuence bias.
Proof. Equation 3.3 is a ﬁrst-order difference equation that can be solved given initial con-
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ditions 0 and K , where we use the assumption that tK = K for all t:
t+1 = At+10 +
 
tX
=0
A
!
BK :
With  > 0, we know that each row of  the non-negative matrix A has a sum that is strictly
less than one, which implies that the spectral radius of A is strictly less than one. But then
limt!1At is the zero matrix. Additionally, since (I + A + A2 + : : : ) is a Neumann series
with spectral radius strictly less than one,
Pt
=0A
 = (I A) 1. Thus, 1  limt!1 t =
limt!1At+10 + limt!1
 Pt
=0A


BK = (I   A) 1BK .
Deﬁne   (1   )(1   ). Then, (I   A) =
264+   
  + 
375, with det(I   A) =
(+ )  2 = (2+ ). Then,
(I   A) 1B = 1
(2+ )
264+  
 + 
375
264  (1  )
(1  ) 
375
=
1
2+ 
264 +  + (1  )
+ (1  ) + 
375 :
Deﬁne
w  + 
2+ 
=
(1  )(1  ) + 
2(1  )(1  ) +  =
(1  )(1  ) + 
1  2(1  )(   1
2
)
:
Then, (I A) 1B =  w 1 w1 w w , so 1N1 = wL+(1 w)R and 1N2 = (1 w)L+wR.
Finally, using equation 3.2a, we have 1i2N1 = (1 )1N1+(1 )(1 )1N2+L+
(1 )R = wL+(1 w)R after simpliﬁcation. Similarly, using equation 3.2b we obtain
that 1i2N2 = (1  )(1  )1N1 + (1  )1N2 + (1  )L + R = wL + (1 w)R
after simpliﬁcation, completing the proof.
The weight w is the equilibrium inﬂuence of  candidate R on group N2 (symmetrically,
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the equilibrium inﬂuence of  candidate L on group N1), deﬁned as
w  w + 1
2
=
(1  )(1  ) + 
1  2(1  )(   1
2
)
:
The structure of  the inﬂuence network affects the equilibrium inﬂuence biasw (and weight
w). The following proposition describes the impact of  changes in structural parameters on
this bias w.
Proposition 3.2. Any of  the following results in an increase in the equilibrium inﬂuence bias w:
1. An increase in the penetration parameter .
2. An increase in the level of  homophily .
3. An increase in the direct listening bias .
In other words, an increase in , , or  will increase the magnitude of  the equilibrium inﬂuence bias.
Proof. The derivative of w with respect to  is
@w
@
=
(   1
2
)  2(   1
2
)w
1  2(1  )(   1
2
)
=
w

 2(1  )
1  2(1  )(   1
2
)
(3.4)
so @w
@
 0 if w  0, which is the case since   12 .
The derivative of w with respect to  is
@w
@
=
2(1  )
1  2(1  )(   1
2
)
w (3.5)
so @w
@
 0 if w  0, which is the case since   12 .
The derivative of w with respect to  is
@w
@
=

1  2(1  )(   1
2
)
(3.6)
so @w
@
 0.
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3.3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
We will now examine the equilibrium of  the two-type model with naïve social learning.
We will establish equilibrium existence in a more general model in a later section, but for
now the following theorem will sufﬁce.
Theorem 3.1 (Existence with Two Types). Let x =

4
and  =
b2
2
, where   max jh0j is
the maximum value of  the slope of  the density function h. Then, for any x  x and    there is a
unique symmetric political equilibrium xL =  xR and L =  R.
Essentially, if  the marginal costs of  ideological deviation or opinion distortion are sufﬁ-
ciently steep, then equilibrium exists.11 Moreover, in our symmetric setting there is a unique
equilibrium that is symmetric. This existence theorem can be weakened substantially by
parametrizing the cutoff  values of x and  on the network and policy ideal parameters as
well.
The following theorem characterizes the unique symmetric political equilibrium.
Theorem 3.2 (Equilibrium Characterization). When the unique symmetric political equilibrium
exists,
• the equilibrium inﬂuence bias w =
(  1
2
)
(1 2(1 )(  1
2
)
,
• R = b2 fN2(

x = 0; 

L; 

R),
• L =  R,
• xR = maxf0; x^R   

R
xb
g,
• xL =  xR.
The following is an immediate corollary that describes the equilibrium in terms of  policy
and opinion polarization.
Corollary 3.1. When the unique symmetric political equilibrium exists,
• x = 0,  = 0, and party R’s vote share 	 = 12 ,
11The condition we deﬁne ensures that the objective functions of  the parties are quasiconcave.
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•  = 2b2fN2(0; L; R),
•   N2   N1 = 2w ,
• x = maxf0; ^x   


xb
g,
where ^x  x^R   x^L, the difference between the policy ideals of  the parties.
Given the symmetry of  equilibrium, it is no surprise that policy proposals of  the parties
are symmetric about the median ideal policy of  the population, nor that an equally weighted
average of  the opinions of  the two parties provides an accurate opinion about the true state.
Nevertheless, unless the the equilibrium inﬂuence bias w is zero, there will be opinion
polarization among the voters ( > 0).
The key relationship is the one between the marginal value and the marginal cost of
increasing opinion distortion, as embodied in the implicit function for R
R =
b2

fN2(0; 

L; 

R)
In the symmetric equilibrium, the indifferent voter is the median voter, where the distribu-
tion of  voters has been altered by the persuasion efforts from f(; 0; 0) to f(; L; R). The
within-group distribution of  voter ideal policies h gives shape to the marginal value of  in-
creasing R (which is the increase in the vote share accruing to party R). So, in our simple
two-type model, the equilibrium shape of f mirrors that of h, since the within-group ideal
policy distributions are symmetric about zero. For example, if h is a normal density function,
then f is also a normal density function.
In the canonical case, where x^2  0, so that there is a positive correlation between a
voter’s ideological leaning and their listening bias (rightward ideological bias and rightward
listening bias are positively correlated), the marginal vote share with respect to increasing R
is negative i.e. fN2 is downward sloping with respect to R in equilibrium, whereas marginal
cost of  increasing R is strictly increasing. This equilibrium condition is illustrated in Figure
3.2.
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Equilibrium Influence Bias at 0.0833
Homophily parameter η at 0.7
Listening bias ν at 0.7
Penetration γ at 0.3
R-type baseline average ideal policy at 0.5
R-type baseline s.d. at 1.5
Policy cost parameter α_x at 0.04
Opinion cost parameter α_θ at 0.02
Fraction of voters of each type λ at 0.45
Red vertical line - equilibrium level of opinion 
   polarization between parties
Blue vertical line - equilibrium level of opinion
   polarization between voters
Orange hortizontal line - equilibrium level of 
  policy polarization
marginal cost
marginal voteshare
policy polarization
party opinion divergence
voter opinion polarization
Figure 3.2: Diagram of  marginal vote share and marginal opinion distortion cost in sym-
metric equilibrium with voter-type normally distributed: R on the horizontal axis, with
marginal cost intersecting axis at R = 0.
Equilibrium effects on party opinion divergence due to parameter changes can quali-
tatively be studied within this diagrammatic framework, as demonstrated in the following
subsections.
3.3.3 Comparative Statics of  the Network Structure
There are three network parameters that determine the social inﬂuence network and
related metrics. Perhaps the property of  greatest interest is homophily, which is the propen-
sity of  individuals to be socially connected to other people of  a similar type. In the context
of  the two-type social network, there are groupN1 and group N2 individuals, distinguished
by their expected ideological position (x^) and their expected listening bias (). If  a voter was
“blind” to the type of  others, so that his immediate social neighbors were a representative
sample of  the population, then the proportion ofN1 individuals in his social network would
be 1
1+2
i.e. the population proportion of N1 individuals. In our symmetric setting, this
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would be 1
2
. Thus, when  = 1
2
, there is no homophily, since any individual’s social neigh-
bors is a representative sample. As  increases from 1
2
to 1, the level of  homophily increases
to its maximum level, where voters only communicate with members within their group.
The listening bias  is the second important parameter that describes the structure of
social inﬂuence. Unlike homophily, the listening bias parameterizes the relationship be-
tween a voter and the parties through media. When  = 1
2
, the voter has no listening bias,
because he equally weights the partisan outlets of  the left and the right. When  > 1
2
, voters
from group N1 pay more attention to left outlets than right outlets and voters from group
N2 do the opposite. Thus,  is a measure of  the direct inﬂuence bias in the population.
However, the equilibrium inﬂuence bias is generally larger than the direct bias as a result of
ampliﬁcation due to homophily.
The ﬁnal parameter of  study is the penetration (or media inﬂuence) parameter , which
captures the importance of  direct media and party communication relative to the social
communication of  voters. If  = 0, then opinion formation of  the voters is completely inde-
pendent of  party inﬂuence. In this case, the model reduces to the standard one-dimensional
policy competition, with voter opinions converging to a consensus opinion (which in our
symmetric setting would be the true state of  the world).
Higher levels of  homophily has two counteracting effects – voters’ bias in media con-
sumption is ampliﬁed by an “echo chamber” effect, simultaneously making it easier to keep
voters who already have a favorable listening bias but harder to steal voters who have a
listening bias in favor of  the opposing party. This ampliﬁcation of  the initial bias through
homophily implies that policy competition at the median is reduced by the skimming out
voters at the center, who are pulled away from the median. The lowered level of  policy
competition leads to less moderation in the policy dimension, increasing policy polariza-
tion. The effect of  higher homophily is embodied by the equilibrium inﬂuence bias, which
increases with level of  homophily. This increase in the equilibrium inﬂuence bias reduces
the divergence in public opinions of  the parties, by reducing the marginal value of  opinion
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distortion. However, the divergence of  opinion within the population actually increases be-
cause this reduction in party-level opinion divergence is counteracted by the increase in the
equilibrium inﬂuence bias. Thus, variance of  opinions in the population of  voters increases.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose x  x and    . The level of  policy polarization x and of  opinion
polarization  are positively related to the level of  equilibrium inﬂuence bias w.
Combining this above lemma with our earlier lemma on the impact of  the three network
parameters on the level of  equilibrium inﬂuence bias, we obtain the important theorem.
Theorem 3.3. Suppose x  x and   . When the degree of  homophily  in the network
increases, the level of  policy polarization x and the level of  voter opinion polarization  increases, but the
level of  party opinion polarization  decreases.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper I provide a tractable framework for analyzing electoral competition and
political persuasion that reconciles greater polarization in policy and public opinion with the
changing landscape of  communication networks. Sorting into like-minded groups through
innovations in communication technology, thereby creating social networks displaying a
greater degree of  homophily, can increase the degree of  policy and voter opinion polariza-
tion.
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